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Port state jurisdiction has been used as a means of circumventing the inadequacies of 
enforcement on the high seas, flag states’ ineffectiveness, but also the absence of international 
rules due to lack of consensus at the international level. Pressing and complex problems related 
to the global environment and global commons, such as depletion of fisheries, marine and 
atmosphere pollution and climate change, and foot-dragging in the international community to 
effectively cooperate to tackle these problems have brought the concept of unilateral regulation 
of extraterritorial activities to the forefront. In this respect, the role of the port state, as a first 
point of contact for industries engaged in activities harmful to the global commons (ie fishing 
and shipping), is increasingly important. This article examines the scope and limits of port state 
jurisdiction with respect to measures which may have an extraterritorial impact in the light of the 
law of the sea and international rules on jurisdiction. The aim of the article is to assess whether 
the practice of port states in exercising jurisdiction has contributed to developments regarding 
the exercise of (extraterritorial) jurisdiction as a regulatory tool for the protection of global 
commons. By identifying elements of current state practice regarding exercise of port state 
jurisdiction, the article advances a framework for the most effective exercise of port state 
jurisdiction for the protection of global commons with reference to the principle of common 
concern.  
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Port state jurisdiction has been used as a means of circumventing the inadequacies of 
enforcement on the high seas, flag states’ ineffectiveness, but also the absence of international 
rules due to lack of consensus at the international level. Molenaar refers to “the notion of a 
‘responsible port state’ namely a state committed to making the fullest possible use of its 
jurisdiction under international law in furtherance of not just its own rights and interests but also 
those of the international community.”1 Tanaka’s observation regarding the role of the port state 
as an example of Scelle’s theory of dedoublement fonctionnel2 according to which the port state 
assumes the “role of an organ of the international community in marine environmental 
protection”3 is also pertinent. Use of port state jurisdiction, especially in cases where national 
laws go beyond internationally-prescribed rules and standards, may inevitably have an 
extraterritorial impact. In some instances, ports aim at regulating and take enforcement action 
over vessels for activities outside their national jurisdiction. What a port state can do with respect 
to visiting vessels is of increasing importance in light of attempts by states to expand their 
                                                          
1 E.J. Molenaar, “Port state jurisdiction: towards mandatory and comprehensive use,” in D. Freestone et al., (eds.), 
The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects (Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 209; T.L. McDorman, “Port state 
enforcement: a comment on article 218 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,” 28 Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce (1997), p. 322 comments: “international treaties and practice are simply shifting the burden and 
opportunity for enforcement from the flag state to the local (or port) state”. See also B. Marten, Port State 
Jurisdiction and the Regulation of International Merchant Shipping (Springer, 2013), p. 4. 
2 G. Scelle, “Le phénomène juridique du dédoublement fonctionnel” in W. Schätzel and H.J. Schlochauer (eds.) 
Rechtsfragen der Internationalen Organisation, Festschrift für Hans Wehberg (Frankfurt: Kostermann,1956), p. 
331, definition of dédoublement fonctionnel:  
les agents dotés d’une compétence institutionnelle ou investis par un ordre juridique utilisent leur capacité 
‘fonctionnelle’ telle qu’elle est organisé dans l’ordre juridique qui les a institués, mais pour assurer 
l’efficacité des normes d’un autre ordre juridique privé des organes nécessaire à cette réalisation, ou n’en 
possèdent que d’insuffisants. 
3 Y. Tanaka, “Protection of community interests in international law: the case of the law of the sea,” 15 Max Planck 
Yearbook of UN Law (2011), p. 351 and Y. Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (2nd ed.) (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), p. 295-6. 
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legislation and standards to activities outside their territory with the view to protecting global 
interests and shared resources such as migratory species, the atmosphere and climate change.4  
This is within the framework of a general trend of expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
prompted by a number of contemporary circumstances including the globalisation of the world 
economy, an increase in transnational criminal activities, and a rise in the movement of persons 
beyond national borders.5 Jurisdiction as a regulatory tool in a globalised community has been 
discussed in the academic literature in the framework of global legal pluralism6 and globalised 
jurisdiction.7 Extraterritorial jurisdiction has also been suggested as a mechanism to promote the 
production of global public goods8 and as a tool for the normativisation of the principle of 
common concern.9 Suggestions that jurisdiction should be determined based on international 
interests with the main objective the “increase [of] global welfare and justice,”10 also reflect the 
perception of jurisdiction as a regulatory tool in a globalised community. Appreciating the 
potential of using jurisdiction as a regulatory tool, Scott discusses recent measures adopted by 
the European Union which extent its territorial jurisdiction and argues that this “technique” of 
                                                          
4 P. Sands and J. Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd ed.) (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
p. 193.  
5 International Law Commission (ILC) Report on the work of its 58th Session, [on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction], 
(2006) GA 61st Session Supp. No10 (A/61/10), Annex E, p. 516. See also M.T. Kamminga, “Extraterritoriality,” 
Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012), para. 4.  
6 P. Schiff Berman, “Global Legal Pluralism,” 80 Southern California Review (2006-7), p. 1155-1237.  
7 H.L. Buxbaum, “Territory, territoriality and the resolution of jurisdictional conflict,” 57 American Journal of 
Comparative Law (2009), p. 631 and P. Schiff Berman, “Globalisation of jurisdiction,” 151 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review (2002), p. 490 ff.  
8 G. Shaffer, “International law and global public goods in a legal pluralist world,” 23 European Journal of 
International Law (2012), p. 669-693; N. Krisch, “The decay of consent: international law in an age of global public 
goods,” 108 American Journal of International Law (2014), 7-25; and E. Benvenisti, “Legislating for humanity – 
May states compel foreigners to promote global welfare?”, (February 1, 2013) GlobalTrust Working Paper No. 
2/2013, at <ssrn.com/abstract=2646880>. 
9 T. Cottier, et al., “The Principle of Common Concern and Climate Change,” 52 Archiv des Volkerrechts (2014), p. 
293-324 and D. Shelton, “Common concern of humanity,” Iustum Aequum Salutare V.2009, p. 33-40.  
10 C. Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (2nd ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 186-7. 
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territorial extension “enables the EU to govern activities that are not centred upon the territory of 
the EU and to shape the focus and content of third country and international law.”11  
Pressing and complex problems related to the global environment and global commons, 
such as depletion of fisheries, pollution of the atmosphere and climate change, and foot-dragging 
within the international community to effectively cooperate to tackle these problems have 
brought the concept of unilateral regulation of extraterritorial activities to the forefront. In this 
respect, the role of the port state, as a first point of contact for industries engaged in activities 
harmful to the global commons (i.e., fishing and shipping), is increasingly important.12  
This article examines the scope and limits of port state jurisdiction with respect to 
measures which may have an extraterritorial impact in the light of the law of the sea and 
international rules on jurisdiction. The article initially discusses the scope and limits of state 
jurisdiction with reference to jurisdictional principles recognised in international law. The 
concept of port state jurisdiction and its relationship with the right of a state to regulate access to 
its ports is examined. State practice plays an important role in the development and validation of 
jurisdictional assertions and establishment of jurisdictional principles in customary international 
law. Therefore, specific instances of application and enforcement of port state measures aiming 
at protection of global commons and entailing an extraterritorial element, such as unilaterally-
prescribed vessel construction, design, equipment and manning (CDEM) standards, operational 
standards such as requirements for the provision of information, measures related to fishing 
activities, and pollution and emission regulation, are scrutinised, and their compatibility with 
jurisdictional principles assessed. In this framework, a further suggestion is explored: to what 
                                                          
11 J. Scott, “Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU law,” 62 American Journal of Comparative Law 
(2013), p. 89. 
12 Marten, supra note 1, p. 225, argues that “the environmental field in particular will undoubtedly see the fiercest 




extent the specific enforcement measures may be relevant or may have an impact on the 
jurisdictional basis.  
The aim of the article is to assess whether the practice of port states in exercising 
jurisdiction has contributed to developments regarding the exercise of (extraterritorial) 
jurisdiction as a regulatory tool for the protection of global commons. A combination of practical 
and theoretical perspectives is attempted. By identifying elements of current state practice 
regarding the exercise of port state jurisdiction, the articles advances a framework for the most 
effective exercise of port state jurisdiction for the protection of global commons with reference 
to the principle of common concern.  
II. Jurisdiction in International Law: Scope and Limits of Jurisdictional Principles  
Jurisdiction has been defined by Oppenheim as “the extent of each state’s right to regulate 
conduct or the consequence of events” and “the legal competence of a state … to make, apply, 
and enforce rules of conduct upon persons.”13 Jurisdiction refers to the authority of a state to 
prescribe laws (prescriptive jurisdiction), and the power to enforce them via either executive or 
judiciary authorities (enforcement jurisdiction; the power of the courts to adjudicate a case has 
been referred to as adjudicatory jurisdiction).14 How international law determines the scope and 
limits of state jurisdiction is not clear. The Lotus Case15 created some confusion in this respect. 
The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) found that a state can exercise jurisdiction in 
any case not explicitly prohibited by international law:  
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that states may not extent 
the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property 
                                                          
13 Oppenheim’s International Law (9th ed.) edited by R. Jennings and A. Watts (Longman, 1996), Vol. 1, p. 456. 
14 D.W. Bowett, “Jurisdiction: changing patterns of authority over activities and resources,” 53 British Yearbook of 
International Law (1982), p. 1. See also: Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, para 
401 (a-c); Ryngaert, supra note 10, p. 9-10; ILC Report on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 5, p. 518; B. 
Oxman, “Jurisdiction”, Max Planck Encyclopaedia, supra note 5, para. 3-4; and M. Akehurst, “Jurisdiction in 
international law,” 46 British Yearbook of International Law (1972-3), p. 151. 
15 SS Lotus, P.C.I.J. Reports, Series A, No. 10 (1927). 
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or acts, outside their territory, [international law] leaves them in this respect a wide 
measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as 
regards other cases, every state remains free to adopt the principles which it regards 
as best and most suitable.16  
 
The positivistic view of the PCIJ has been criticised,17 but confusion continues with respect to 
the scope of state jurisdiction and the role and status of jurisdictional principles in international 
law. 
On one hand, it has been generally accepted that jurisdiction is to be exercised according to 
a number of jurisdictional bases/principles accepted by states to be in line with international 
law.18 The development and recognition in state and judicial practice of specific jurisdictional 
bases demonstrate that states have accepted that jurisdiction needs to rely on one or more 
jurisdictional principles19 the scope and limits of which are determined by state practice, namely 
assertions of jurisdiction and acceptance by other states. On the other hand, it has been suggested 
that general principles of international law, such as equality of states, non-intervention and the 
principle of territorial integrity, determine the scope of jurisdiction in international law.20 These 
                                                          
16 Ibid., p. 18-19.  
17 See F.A. Mann, “The doctrine of jurisdiction in international law,” 111 Recueil des Cours (1964-I), p. 35; V. 
Lowe and C. Staker, “Jurisdiction” in M.D. Evans (ed) International Law (3rd ed.), (Oxford University Press, 2010), 
p. 319-20; M. Shaw, International Law (6th ed.) (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 656; and Ryngaert, supra 
note 10, p. 30-34. 
18 Ryngaert, supra note 10, p. 39; Shaw, supra note 17, p. 652; and Lowe and Staker, supra note 17, p. 320. See also 
Arrest Warrant Case of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), [2002] I.C.J. Reports 3, Joint 
Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, p. 78. 
19 Lowe and Staker supra note 17, p. 315; Shaw, supra note 17, p. 652; R.Y. Jennings, “The limits of state 
jurisdiction,” 32 Nordisk Idsskrift International Ret (1962), p. 210; and U.S. Third Restatement, supra note 14, para 
402. See the approach of the United Kingdom noted in ILC Report on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 5, p. 
521.  See, however, Oppenheim, supra note 13, p. 457, where it is argued that “although it is usual to consider the 
exercise of jurisdiction under one or other of more or less widely accepted categories, this is more a matter of 
convenience than of substance.”  
20 Bowett, supra note 14, p. 14-18.  See also: Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. 
Spain) [1962], I.C.J. Reports, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Fitzmaurice para. 70, p. 105:  
it is true that under present conditions international law does not impose hard and fast rules on states 
delimiting spheres of national jurisdiction in such matters ...  but leaves to states a wide discretion in the 
matter. It does, however (a) postulate the existence of limits – though in any given case it may be for the 
tribunal to indicate what these are for the purposes of that case; and (b) involve for every state an 
obligation to exercise moderation and restraint as to the extent of the jurisdiction assumed by the courts in 
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principles may inform the scope of recognised jurisdictional principles but also contribute to 
further developments in the exercise of jurisdiction.  
Jurisdictional principles are, as Crawford points out, “in substance generalisations of a 
mass of national provisions,”21 which have been accepted in state practice as reflecting a 
consensus on acceptable jurisdictional bases in international law.  The jurisdictional principles, 
which are broadly determined so as to allow flexibility, are reflective of a certain jurisdictional 
link between the state exercising jurisdiction and the regulated activity. Reasonableness and the 
general principles suggested above, however, have a place in ascertaining jurisdictional limits 
with respect to existing jurisdictional principles and new assertions leading to further 
developments.  
The most common and fundamental jurisdictional basis deriving its authority from the 
principle of sovereignty is the territorial principle.22 Territorial jurisdiction is presumed to apply 
with respect to events taking place wholly or partly within the territory of a state. The objective 
and subjective territorial principles have been accepted in instances where part of the activity or 
one of the constituent elements of an offence occur outside the territory of a state.23 The 
territorial principle does not cover the exercise of prescriptive or enforcement jurisdiction with 
respect to activities which take place wholly outside its territory.24 Principles of extraterritorial 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
cases having a foreign element, and to avoid undue encroachment on a jurisdiction more properly 
appertaining to, or more appropriately exercisable by, another state.  
 
21 J. Crawford, Brownlie’s International Law (8th ed) (Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 477. See also Oppenheim, 
supra note 13, p. 457: “much of the law relating to jurisdiction has developed through the decisions of national 
courts applying the laws of their own states”.  
22 See Bowett, supra note 14, p. 4: the territorial principle is “the most fundamental of all principles governing 
jurisdiction. Indeed the proposition that a state has the right to regulate conduct within its territory would be 
regarded as axiomatic.”  
23 See Akehurst, supra note 14, p. 152-3; Lowe and Staker, supra note 17, p. 321-2; and C. Ryngaert, “Territorial 
Jurisdiction Over Cross-frontier Offences: Revisiting a Classic Problem of International Criminal Law,” 9 
International Criminal Law Review (2009) p. 197-209 where he reviews the relevant legislation of a number of 
countries. 
24 Shaw, supra note 17, p. 653.  
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jurisdiction have been developed to justify the exercise of jurisdiction in such cases.25 In these 
cases, a jurisdictional link exists which justifies the exercise of jurisdiction: the person involved 
in an activity – either actor or victim – is a national of that state (nationality principle – active or 
passive); a security interest of the state is involved (protective principle); all states have an 
interest due to the nature of the crimes (universal jurisdiction); the state suffers (direct and 
substantial) effects from the specific activity (effects doctrine). The effects doctrine, mainly 
supported by U.S. jurisprudence with respect to anti-trust legislation, remains controversial.26 
International treaties may also provide the legal basis for the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.27  
The relationship between territorial and extraterritorial jurisdiction is not always clear and 
different states perceive the distinction differently.28  Higgins argues that “a broad interpretation 
of territoriality overlaps in part with what has been defined by others as extraterritorial.”29 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction is based on the presumption that despite the jurisdictional link, the 
regulated activity has taken place outside a state’s territory.30 It means that no (or no sufficient) 
territorial link can be established. As mentioned above, states have expanded the scope of 
territorial jurisdiction in instances where the act has only partly taken place within the territory of 
the state or due to the nature of the crime as being continuous. The broad construction of the 
                                                          
25 R. Higgins, “Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It,” (Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 
73, notes “logically, all exercises of jurisdiction that are not based on the territoriality principle are exercises of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.” See also ILC Report on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 5, p. 520. 
26 The effects doctrine is discussed further below. 
27 See, for example, U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, article 218. For treaty-based 
“universal” jurisdiction see, for example, articles 49, 50, 129 and 149 of the four Geneva Conventions respectively 
75 U.N.T.S. 31. For treaties providing for universal jurisdiction in relation to the principle of aut dedere aut judicare 
see the Convention For the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971), U.N.T.S. 974, 
article 5 and the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970), U.N.T.S. 860, article 
4. See further L. Rydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives (Oxford 
University Press, 2003), p. 43-68. 
28 Jennings, supra note 19, p. 214. Ryngaert, supra note 10, p. 8-9, argues that “the exact meaning of ‘territoriality’ 
depends not only on the state or entity interpreting it, but also on the field of law where it is applied.” 
29 Higgins, supra note 25, p. 76. See also Ryngaert, supra note 10, p. 162-7. 
30 Kamminga, supra note 5, para 1.  
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territorial principle, especially related to transnational crimes and economic globalisation,31 
creates difficulties with respect to drawing a clear line between territorial and extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and the determination of the scope of the former. This uncertainty can be 
demonstrated by the “effects doctrine”. This doctrine has been suggested as being part of 
objective territorial jurisdiction, due to the fact that the effects of the regulated activities are 
realised in the territory of the state exercising jurisdiction.32  However, there is no physical act 
taking place within the territory to justify prescriptive jurisdiction.33 In many instances of the 
effects doctrine, the regulated activity is legal according to the laws of the state. In this sense, the 
effects doctrine significantly expands the jurisdictional competence of a state where the activity 
takes place.34 The European Union, despite its initial reluctance, appears to have accepted the 
doctrine both in cases where there is an intraterritorial element, such as the existence of an agent 
of a subsidiary company within the framework of the concept of “economic unity,”35 but also in 
                                                          
31 Ryngaert, supra note 10, p. 99, points out that common law countries, especially the United States, have 
constructed the territorial principle broadly for these purposes.  See also A.L. Parrish, “Evading legislative 
jurisdiction”, articles by Maurer Faculty, Paper 887 (2012), p. 1691-1699, at 
<www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/887>. 
32 Crawford, supra note 21, p. 459, refers to violation of antitrust as objective territorial jurisdiction. Ryngaert, supra 
note 10, p. 76, states that “international law seems ... to have satisfied itself with requiring that either the criminal act 
or its effects have taken place within a state’s territory for the state to legitimately exercise territorial jurisdiction 
irrespective of the municipal characterisation of the act or the effects (in practice usually the effects) as a constituent 
element of the offence.” G.F. Hess, “The Trail Smelter, the Columbia River, and the extraterritorial application of 
CERCLA” 18 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review (2005), p. 25 refers to extraterritorial 
application when “the potentially responsible party ... is not a US citizen, the conduct does not take place in the US, 
or the effects do not occur in the US’ signifying that when the effects are felt in the territory this is not 
extraterritorial application of the laws.  
33 Bowett, supra note 14, p. 7. Lowe and Staker, supra note 17, p. 322-3, argue: “it is the reliance upon economic 
repercussions within the territory rather than upon some element of intraterritorial conduct, that distinguishes the 
effects doctrine in its pure form from objective territorial jurisdiction, which does require some intraterritorial 
conduct." Akehurst, supra note 14,  p. 152-5 comments: “Once we abandon the ‘constituent elements’ approach in 
favour of the ‘effects’ approach, we embark on a slippery slope which leads away from the territorial principles 
towards universal jurisdiction.”  
34 K. Hixson, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States”, 12 Fordham International Law Journal (1988), p. 144-150.  
35 J.J. Friedber, “The convergence of law in an era of political integration: the Wood Pulp case and the Alcoa effects 
doctrine,” 52 University of Pittsburg Law Review (1990-1) 308-323 and Lowe and Staker, supra note 17, p. 329.  
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cases with no apparent intraterritorial activity without however clearly recognising the effects 
doctrine as its jurisdictional basis.36   
Jurisdiction may finally develop on an ad hoc, case-specific way related to particular types 
of activities.37 The jurisdictional link in these cases may be determined by the specific nature of 
the regulated activities as accepted in state practice. To what extent this jurisdictional link can be 
generalised in other similar cases will depend upon the similarities in the regulation, the rationale 
of the exercise of jurisdiction and the acceptance by other states.  
III. The Jurisdictional Competence of the Port State 
A. Port State Jurisdiction and Extraterritoriality 
Ports are part of the territory of the state where the latter exercises sovereignty, and therefore, the 
port state can exercise such jurisdiction as it would be able to exercise in any part of its 
territory.38 Port state jurisdiction is a corollary to the principle of state sovereignty and primarily 
– but not exclusively - a case of territorial jurisdiction. Legislative and enforcement jurisdiction 
need to comply with the international rules on jurisdiction and the law of the sea. The temporary 
presence of the vessels in the ports of a state along with the global nature of shipping activities 
                                                          
36 In the Wood Pulp case the CJEU found that ‘the Community’s jurisdiction to apply its competition rules to such 
conduct is covered by the territoriality principle as universally recognised in public international law’ relying on the 
place where the agreement was implemented (para. 15-8); Åhlström Osakeyhtiö and others v Commission (joined 
cases ‘Wood pulp’) Judgment of 27 September 1988, European Court Reports 1988. Re Wood Pulp Cartel [1988] 4 
Common Market Law Review, p. 941.  
R. Higgins, supra note 25, p. 75, argues that the European Court in this case asserted jurisdiction over a cartel 
without agents in the European Union and that “the effects doctrine has now been accepted in all but name.” See 
also Friedber, supra note 35, p. 318-322. M. Jeffrey “The implications of the Wood Pulp case for the European 
Communities,” 4 Leiden Journal of International Law (1991), p. 103-4, argues that the Wood Pulp Case did not 
support the effects doctrine. 
On the growing acceptance of the EU’s interests in exercising jurisdiction over foreign activities which 
generate effects in the EU market, see: “Developments in the law of Extraterritoriality,” 124 Harvard Law Review 
(2011), p. 1254-6 and Scott, supra note 11, p. 88.  
37 Lowe and Staker, supra note 17, p. 316, argue that “US doctrine appears to treat jurisdiction as an aspect of the 
substantive topic that is regulated” and they continue “if this trend persists the principles of jurisdiction may 
fragment, so that states may assert a more extensive jurisdiction over, say, tax matters and ‘terrorist’ offences than 
they do over unlawful arms sales and other crimes.”  
38 T.L. McDorman, “Regional port state control agreements: some issues of international law,” 5 Ocean and Coastal 
Law Journal (2000), p. 210: “within the ports a state has the same (territorial) jurisdiction which it would have over 
a foreign citizen visiting (temporarily on holiday or on business) the territory”. 
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have been taken into account with respect to the application (or more appropriately non-
application) of general civil and criminal laws in cases which relate to the internal affairs or 
economy of the vessel and when the peace of the port is not affected or disturbed.39 Port state 
measures for the protection of the environment do not concern solely the internal affairs of 
visiting vessels and, therefore, the internal economy doctrine is not a restrictive factor for their 
application.40  
What is more, the mere physical presence of the vessel in the port does not give the port 
state unlimited (prescriptive) territorial jurisdiction.41 It facilitates enforcement, but does not 
justify it. Enforcement jurisdiction within the territory of a state must be justified on a valid 
prescriptive jurisdictional basis.42 The territoriality principle will normally concern the exercise 
of jurisdiction by a state for activities which take place wholly or partly in its territory.43 
Violations of national laws occurring in the internal waters and ports are ipso facto covered by 
territorial jurisdiction. Article 220(1) of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) 
provides for an extended territorial jurisdiction, since it expands the legislative jurisdiction of the 
state to violations taking place in the maritime zones where it exercises sovereignty (territorial 
sea) and certain sovereign rights in the 200-n. mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ).44 Molenaar 
                                                          
39 Different approaches have been applied by civil and common law countries with respect to their abstention from 
intervening. Common law countries argue that the port state has jurisdiction in such cases but chooses not to 
exercise it as a matter of comity. On the other hand, civil law countries argue that in cases pertaining exclusively to 
the internal peace of the vessel, the port state does not have jurisdiction as a matter of customary international law. 
See Marten, supra note 1, p. 28-31 and R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester University 
Press, 1999), p. 65-68. See also Oppenheim, supra note 13, p. 622-4.  
40 Churchill and Lowe, supra note 39, p. 67.  
41 McDorman, supra note 1, p. 314 comments: “the fact that a foreign vessel has voluntarily entered a port does not 
make internationally-questionable legislation enforceable against the foreign vessel. If the local state has no 
recognised jurisdictional basis for a law, the enforcement of the law, if not the law itself, is inconsistent with 
international law”.  
42 See Bowett, supra note 14, p. 1 who states: “there can be no enforcement jurisdiction unless there is prescriptive 
jurisdiction”.  
43 McDorman, supra note 38, p. 216 comments: “Customary international law directs that a port state can only 
enforce laws that relate to activities of a foreign vessel that take place while the vessel is in port.”  
44 LOSC, supra note 27, article 220(1):  
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refers to this as quasi-territorial jurisdiction.45 Such legislative jurisdiction needs to be in line 
with the competence enjoyed by the state in the specific maritime zone. For example, a state can 
exercise enforcement jurisdiction in its ports for violation of its laws in the EEZ only when those 
laws have been adopted according to the jurisdictional competence given to the coastal state in 
this maritime zone. Laws requiring foreign vessels to comply with nationally (and not 
internationally)-stipulated standards contrary to article 211(5) LOSC46 cannot form the basis for 
“quasi-territorial” jurisdiction in the port and cannot, therefore, be enforced therein, unless the 
violation of national laws continues in the port.  
The port state can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction either based on a treaty provision or 
in any way a state is allowed to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction as discussed above. With 
respect to regulating and exercising jurisdiction over activities which take place on the high seas, 
the jurisdiction of a state may contravene rules related to the high seas, specifically flag-state 
exclusive jurisdiction and the non-subjection of any part of the high seas to its sovereignty 
(articles 87 and 89 LOSC).  The LOSC in article 218 has innovatively allowed the port state to 
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction for activities “in violation of applicable international rules 
and standards established through the competent international organisation or general diplomatic 
conference” outside its maritime zones regarding discharges from a vessel.47 A contrario, this 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
when a vessel is voluntarily within a port or at an off-shore terminal of a state, that state may, subject to 
section 7, institute proceedings in respect of any violation of its laws and regulations adopted in 
accordance with this Convention or applicable international rules and standards for the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution from vessels when the violation has occurred within the territorial sea, 
or the exclusive economic zone of that state”.  
45 E.J. Molenaar, “Port State Jurisdiction: Toward Comprehensive, Mandatory and Global Coverage,” 38 Ocean 
Development and International Law (2007), p. 196. 
46 LOSC, supra note 27, article 211(5) provides that the coastal state “may in respect of their EEZ adopt laws and 
regulations for the prevention reduction and control of pollution from vessels conforming to and giving effect to 
generally accepted international rules and standards established through the competent international organisation or 
general diplomatic conference.”  
47 See McDorman, supra note 1, p. 305-322. L.S. Johnson, Coastal State Regulation of International Shipping 
(Oceana, 2004), p. 41, notes that this applies “regardless of whether the state in which the ship is registered is a party 
to the instrument imposing such a rule and standard or even whether the enforcing port state is itself a party to it.”  
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provision does not grant ports enforcement jurisdiction for discharges on the high seas which are 
in violation of national (and not international) standards.48  
Distinguishing between territorial and extraterritorial jurisdiction may depend on the 
design of national legislation and the definition of the specific offence. How national law 
determines the location of the violation and the nature of the crime (i.e., continuous offence) 
would be important for the establishment of jurisdiction. The “territorialisation of the offence”49 
may be straightforward with respect to static requirements (requirements which follow the vessel 
throughout its voyage and cannot, due to their nature, change), but may be more problematic 
with respect to other standards and rules, as will be explained below.  
This territorialisation of an offence is also linked to the customarily-established right of a 
port state to regulate and deny access to its ports. Despite some early disagreement on the 
existence of a right of access of foreign vessels into ports as part of customary international law, 
there is now general agreement that the port state has the right to deny and regulate access to its 
ports.50 According to article 211(3) LOSC, coastal states can “establish particular requirements 
for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment as a condition 
                                                          
48 McDorman, supra note 1, p. 319-20 notes that the discharges obligations established by the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (1973) and the Protocol of 1978, (MARPOL), 130 U.N.T.S. 
61, are considered as forming “applicable international rules and standards”. See also Tanaka (2015), supra note 3, 
p. 296.  
McDorman, p. 321-2, opines that this provision restricts the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction as recognised 
in international law based on the effects doctrine. He argues that “under existing law, where the discharge violation 
affects the port state, enforcement action arguably could be taken.” According to this author, article 218 goes 
beyond the existing regime by not requiring the existence of effect and argues that “ratification and implementation 
of article 218 of the LOS Convention will require states to accept the limitation on their jurisdiction while 
embracing a new opportunity to control vessel-source pollution discharges.”  
49 H. Ringbom, “Global problem – Regional solution? International law reflections on an EU CO2 Emissions 
Trading Scheme for ships,” 26 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce (2011), p. 628 indicates that all will depend 
on “defining the violation in such terms that it takes place in the port.” See also H. Ringbom, EU Maritime Safety 
Policy and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), p. 359. 
50 L.de La Fayette, “Access to ports in international law,” 11 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 
(1996), p. 1-22; A.V. Lowe, “The right of entry into maritime ports in international law,” 14 San Diego Law Review 
(1976-7), 597-622; G.C. Kasoulides, Port State Control and Jurisdiction: Evolution of the Port State Regime 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), p. 2-22; V. Tasikas, “The regime of maritime port access: a relook at contemporary 
international land US law,” 5 Lloyds Maritime Law Journal (2007), p. 44; Churchill and Lowe, supra note 39, p. 62; 
and Ringbom (2008), supra note 49, p. 207-8. 
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for the entry of foreign vessels into their ports or internal waters.” There is no reference to 
“generally accepted international rules and standards established through the competent 
international organisation” as is found in other paragraphs of this article (i.e., para. 5 regarding 
the EEZ), and, therefore, these measures can go beyond internationally prescribed standards.51 
The LOSC necessitates states to give “due publicity to such requirements” and to communicate 
them to the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Therefore, states have the right to 
establish (nationally-determined) entry criteria52 and to deny access to their ports for vessels not 
complying with these requirements – subject to general principles such as non-discrimination,53 
good faith and abuse of right (article 300 LOSC),54 and treaty-based obligations especially those 
trade-related.55  
The right of a state to regulate access to its ports has inherent and consequential 
extraterritorial effects. By establishing entry requirements, especially beyond international 
standards, the port state can regulate the conduct of vessels in areas beyond its national 
jurisdiction.56 However, a number of contentious issues arise especially with respect to the 
relationship between prescribing entry requirements and exercising jurisdiction over vessels in 
                                                          
51 G.L. Rose and B. Tsamenyi, “Universalising jurisdiction over marine living resources crime: A report for WWF 
International” (2013), at <ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2261&context=lhapapers>, p. 68: “as the port 
state can set these conditions as a manifestation of its sovereignty, there is no requirement that the conditions 
themselves be limited to reflect a specific international legal norm already set in place by international agreement”.  
52 LOSC, supra note 27, article 211(3) permits the port state to prescribe requirements regarding vessel construction, 
design, equipment and manning (CDEM) but since the right to regulate access to its ports is based on state 
sovereignty, entry requirements are not limited to CDEM. E.J. Molenaar, “Port State Jurisdiction,” Max Planck 
Encyclopaedia, supra note 5, para. 9-10, 29-30. 
53 See Churchill and Lowe, supra note 39, p. 63 who comment that: “port closures or conditions of access which are 
patently unreasonable or discriminatory might be held to amount to an abus de droit for which the coastal state 
might be internationally responsible”. See also LOSC, supra note 27, articles 24(1)(b), 25(3), 119(3) and 227. 
54 See Ringbom (2008), supra note 49, p. 225-228 and Tasikas, supra note 50, p. 44. 
55 H. Ringbom (2008), supra note 49, p. 231-234. 
56 T. Keselj, “Port state jurisdiction in respect of pollution from ships: the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea and the Memoranda of Understanding” 30 Ocean Development and International Law (1999), p. 149, discusses 
the need to balance port state jurisdiction with freedom of navigation and finds that since the enforcement powers 
arise when the vessel enters the port, “the exercise of navigation, in the abstract, is not impeded. However, the 
exercise of port state powers may result in a restraint on the freedom of navigation, meaning the freedom to navigate 
for trade purposes, when such powers are used to deny port access to foreign vessels that are not compliant with the 
port entry requirements”.  
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the port. Is the right to prescribe entry requirements restricted by the existence of a jurisdictional 
basis? Would this be related to the specific enforcement measure adopted by the state?  
On one hand, the right of the state to regulate access is a reflection of its sovereignty; on 
the other hand, territorial jurisdiction, which is based on the concept of sovereignty, requires a 
territorial link for its exercise. As Molenaar rightly argues: “the absence of this right [of access to 
ports under customary international law] does not mean that extra-territorial port state 
jurisdiction is exempt from the need for a sufficient jurisdictional link”.57 Entry requirements and 
prescriptive jurisdiction do not necessarily coincide and, therefore, jurisdictional principles have 
to be taken into account when exercising jurisdiction in the port on the basis of entry 
requirements.58 On the other hand, it has been suggested that states may establish such unilateral 
extraterritorial conditions on the basis of the vessel’s voluntary entry into the port and the public 
announcement of the entry requirement which reflect the consent of the visiting vessel to the 
exercise of jurisdiction.59 Non-compliance with the entry requirement can or may be said to give 
the port state the right to exercise jurisdiction for the breach occurring within the port.60 The 
scope of jurisdiction may also be linked to the enforcement measures a state can adopt against 
non-compliant vessels in its ports.61 Should enforcement measures be restricted to refusal of 
                                                          
57 Molenaar, supra note 45, p. 229.  
58 B.D. Smith, State Responsibility and the Marine Environment (Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 171-2, seems to argue 
that any port entry condition with an extraterritorial effect should be justified on a jurisdictional ground and that: “if 
the principles of jurisdiction are to retain integrity and function, such tactical avoidances [entry requirements 
regulating extraterritorial activities] should not be permitted”.  
59 Johnson, supra note 47, p. 41-3. 
60 Rose and Tsamenyi, supra note 51, comment: “The mere fact of entering port in breach of the condition set by the 
port state unilaterally triggers its enforcement power, nor does any offence under international law itself need to 
have been committed prior to the vessel entering port in order for the port state to exercise its national enforcement 
powers”.  
Marten, supra note 1, p. 101, argues that “the port state can frame the argument as one about what it can do in 
relation to its sovereign territory, as opposed to what foreign vessels can do on the high seas.” Also Ringbom 
(2011), supra note 49, p. 626-7. 
61 Molenaar, supra note 45, suggests that “the legality or justifiability of extra-territorial port state jurisdiction 
depends, in addition to the abovementioned jurisdictional bases, on the type of enforcement action taken.” Ringbom 
(2011), supra note 49, p. 627 acknowledges the “paradoxical situation … in which it is easier for a State to defend 
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entry or services in the port, or can the state adopt more intrusive measures such as refusal of 
departure, arrest, detention, confiscation of cargo/assets, imposition of fines? Would the more 
intrusive measures require a jurisdictional basis for their exercise?  
There may be no straightforward answer to these questions, and as will be discussed 
below, much will depend on practice, but it needs to be noted that entry requirements and 
jurisdiction share a common element – the non-abuse of rights. Entry requirements have to be 
stipulated in good faith and in line with the concept of non-abuse of right, which relates to a 
“disproportionate encroachment upon the rights of other states”.62 Jurisdiction also relies on a 
balancing of rights and the avoidance of encroaching upon the rights of other states.63 The two 
concepts equally rely on balancing of rights and reasonableness.  
Answers to questions related to the validity of entry requirements and exercise of 
jurisdiction depend on state practice and state reaction,64 and its consolidation into customary 
law. As noted by Akehurst, “protests generally hold jurisdictional claims within reasonable 
bounds. If other states choose to acquiesce in the claim, it will become established in customary 
law”.65 Marten argues that:  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
its right to refuse entry to its ports for non-complying ships than to find a legal basis for enforcing those conditions 
by means of other sanctions once the ship has actually entered”. See also Ringbom (2008), supra note 49, p. 369-
377. 
62 Ryngaert, supra note 10, p. 160 argues that “states may not assert their jurisdictional freedom if it would actually 
serve their legitimate interests, but instead disturb the peace of another state.” On abuse of right, see M. Byers, 
“Abuse of rights: an old principle, a new age,” (2002) 47 McGill Law Journal 389 and G.D.S. Taylor, “The Content 
of the Rule Against Abuse of Rights in International Law,” 46 British Yearbook of International Law (1972-3), p. 
331. 
63 Ryngaert, supra note 10, p. 160, argues that “pursuant to the harm test then, it could be examined whether the 
exercise of jurisdiction in actual cases is reasonable, viz whether it does not amount to an abuse of rights or to 
arbitrariness’ stressing ‘a case-by-case reasonableness analysis.” Byers, supra note 62, p. 424, also stresses the 
usefulness of the doctrine of abuse of right in cases of “activities that occur outside the territory of any state, in 
common spaces, such as the high seas, or in multiple states without any particular territorial nexus, as is the case 
with the internet and some source of pollution.”  
64 Lowe and Staker, supra note 17, p. 332, discuss the question of whether it is possible to redraft every offence so as 
to make it a crime for a vessel to enter the state having done x, y, z before entry and argue that “there is no clear 
theoretical answer to this problem”, and that a “falling back on common sense” relying on the reaction of other 
states may provide the answer.  
65 Akehurst, supra note 14, p. 176. See also Ryngaert, supra note 10, p. 44-45.  
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provided laws governing extraterritorial operations are carefully tailored, meaning 
enforcement on a day to day basis is unobtrusive enough to compel compliance 
without giving rise to any international protest, then … these arguments are likely to 
gain ground over time by way of a growing body of state practice.66 
  
Jurisdictional competence will depend on the design of the offence (prohibited act) in national 
laws, its reasonableness and state practice including states’ reactions.  
The following subsection attempts to elucidate, on the basis of state practice, the approach 
of states to the general right of a state to regulate entry to its ports and exercise jurisdiction over 
vessels therein with respect to environmental protection and the potential ascertainment of a 
jurisdictional link. In this framework, the limits between territorial and extraterritorial 
jurisdiction will be clarified with reference to the grey areas in state practice. Moreover, a 
suggestion is explored: to what extent are the specific enforcement measures relevant or have an 
impact on the jurisdictional basis?  
B. Exercise of Port State Jurisdiction in Practice and Jurisdictional Principles  
1. Condition-related requirements: Standards related to construction, design, 
equipment and manning (CDEM) 
 
States have enacted laws requiring vessels to comply with CDEM standards both as entry 
requirements and rules to be complied with while in port. Normally, these measures are in the 
international treaties adopted under the auspices of the IMO. The exercise of prescriptive 
jurisdiction related to CDEM standards beyond those required by international treaty law raises 
concerns regarding their extraterritorial application, since the vessel needs to conform to such 
requirements throughout its voyage even when outside a port state’s maritime zones. Authors 
either point out that these standards form part of a continuous activity which also takes place in 
the port,67 or stress that the incidental extraterritorial effect of these measures is not the primary 
                                                          
66 Marten, supra note 1, p. 104.  
67 Ringbom (2008), supra note 49, p. 329 and McDorman, supra note 1, p. 315.  
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purpose of national legislation and enforcement action.68 Although the aim of these measures is 
to regulate extraterritorial activities,69 jurisdiction may be justified on the territorial principle due 
to the static nature of the standards.70 With respect to enforcement measures for non-compliance 
with CDEM national laws, the state may provide (and has provided) for sanctions, such as fines 
and penalties, but more intrusive measures such detention, arrest or seizure of visiting vessels in 
cases of nationally-prescribed requirements are more controversial.71 Proportionality between the 
sanctions and the offence is required. Ringbom calls for caution in cases of purely regional 
requirements, noting that “the appropriateness of using detentions for enforcing compliance with 
regional requirements is not self-evident”.72  
Uncertainty with respect to more stringent enforcement measures in cases of nationally-
prescribed requirements is demonstrated by the Sellers v Maritime Safety Inspector Case, from 
New Zealand, which concerned the denial of exit due to non-compliance with a nationally-
prescribed requirement.73 A broad approach links the right to deny exit to the right to regulate 
                                                          
68 Molenaar, supra note 45, p. 198 and V. Frank, The European Community and Marine Environmental Protection 
in the International Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), p. 213. 
69 See, for example, the measures adopted by the EU following the Erika and Prestige accidents with respect to 
double-hulled tankers. Regulation (ED) No 1726/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 
2003 amending Regulation (ED) No 417/2002 on the accelerated phasing-in of double-hull or equivalent design 
requirements for single-hull oil tankers Official Journal L 249/1 (1.10.2003). These measures were endorsed in the 
IMO soon after. Resolution MEPC.111(50) – Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 relating to the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, MEPC 50/3, 50th session, December 
2003, Annex I, available on the IMO website, at <www.imo.org>. 
70 Molenaar, supra note 45, p. 198.  
71 McDorman, supra note 38, p. 223, argues that “there does not appear to be any restriction in international law 
regarding the type of penalty that can be levied against a foreign vessel which, while in port, breaches such laws or 
standards. Thus detention, arrest or seizure of a visiting vessel would be possible”. See also Ringbom (2008), supra 
note 49, p. 284-5. To the contrary, R. Lagoni, “The prompt release of vessels and crews before the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: a preparatory report,” 11 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (1996), 
p. 155, argues that “a detention for not complying with the port entry requirements of the port state that are more 
stringent than the applicable international rules and standards” is an example of a detention inconsistent with 
international law. 
72 Ringbom (2008), supra note 49, p. 228-9 and also p. 285, 344.  
73 Sellers v Maritime Safety Inspector, Judgment of 5 November 1998, 2 New Zealand Law Reports (1999), p. 44.  
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access to the ports in international law.74 A more restrictive approach, as elaborated by the Court 
of Appeal of New Zealand in the Sellers Case, with some support in literature,75 requires a 
treaty-based right to deny exit (such as article 219 or 226 LOSC) or a customary international 
rule. In Sellers, the defendant challenged his prosecution and conviction for permitting his vessel 
Nimbus to leave a New Zealand port without obtaining clearance from the New Zealand 
Maritime Safety Authority as required by national law. The statutory clearance was denied since 
the vessel, contrary to relevant national guidelines and legislation, but not international 
standards, was not equipped with a radio and emergency location beacon. The Court found that 
international treaty rules providing for the right to deny exit did not apply in the specific case as 
the vessel was not in a dangerous state according to international standards.76 The Court did not 
say that the port state did not have jurisdiction over the vessel, but rather that the scope of the 
jurisdiction depended on the extraterritorial effect of the requirement, which was to regulate 
behaviour beyond its territory.77 The Court did not deny that the breach may arise in the port,78 
but took the view that “the reality is ... quite different” and that “the effect, if not the purpose, of 
the provision is to place requirements on the exercise of the freedom to navigate on the high seas 
by reference to the adequacy of the ship, her crew and her equipment for the voyage”.79 Whether 
                                                          
74 Churchill and Lowe, supra note 39, p. 64, argue that detentions of vessels and requiring clearing papers before the 
vessel leaves port “flow from the sovereignty of the state in its ports, and submission to them is arguably an implied 
condition of admission to the ports”. See also Johnson, supra note 47, p. 35-6 (fn. 116).  
75 Z. Oya Özcayir, Port State Control (2nd ed.) (Lloyds Law Publications, 2004), p. 90; J.S. Davidson, “New Zealand 
Freedom of Navigation on the high seas: Sellers v Maritime Safety Inspector” (1999) 14 International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 438; and D. Devine, “Port state jurisdiction: a judicial contribution from New Zealand,” 24 
Marine Policy (2000), p. 218. 
76 Sellers v Maritime Safety Inspector, supra note 73, p. 57. 
77 Ibid, p. 48, 57. The Court of Appeal stated that “a port state has no general power to unilaterally impose its own 
requirements on foreign ships relating to their construction, their safety and other equipment and their crewing if the 
requirements are to have effect on the high seas.” 
78 Ibid., p. 48. 
79 Ibid. Interestingly, while Ringbom (2008), supra note 49, p. 339, dismisses the decision of the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal as not adequately reflecting international law, at p. 345 he reaches a similar conclusion with respect to 
detention and an obligation to rectify the deficiency – without, however, relying on extraterritoriality but on the 
absence of an international requirement (which was also part of the argument of the Court of Appeal) stating that:  
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the extraterritorial effect or objective of the legislation is incidental (as suggested by Molenaar80) 
can be a matter of perception. This demonstrates the uncertainty created by dealing with 
extraterritorial elements as incidental and the use of territoriality as the basis for exercise of 
jurisdiction for the imposition of requirements in the port.81 However, state practice has 
demonstrated that detention with an obligation for rectification (which has the same impact as 
denial of exit until rectification) has been used by states in specific contexts82 as part of port 
enforcement measures. Of course, it would be different if the port state denied exit (or detained a 
vessel) with respect to a requirement for use of the equipment on the high seas. Denial of exit 
should not be linked to denial of access, but to the jurisdictional basis for exercise of jurisdiction, 
which is in this case, due to the static nature of the requirement territorial, but might also depend 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in the absence of any international requirement to that effect, it is uncertain whether the absence of a 
VCR on a pre-2002 cargo ship may be described as a deficiency, and even if it could, it is uncertain 
whether a ship could be forced to install such equipment in that port or in the nearest appropriate repair 
yard. 
80 Molenaar, supra note 1, p. 199, also argues that “the Court of Appeal may have ruled differently if the extra-
territorial effect of the prescribed unilateral standard would have been incidental rather than its sole purpose.” See 
also B. Marten, “Port State Jurisdiction in New Zealand: The Problem with Sellers,” 44 Victoria University College 
Law Review (2013), p. 566-8, who argues that the breach arises in port, and therefore, the port state has jurisdiction. 
81 Ringbom (2011), supra note 49, p. 340, notes that “in many cases the purpose of such static rules is precisely to 
have more widespread effect than the strictly territorial ones.” 
82 See, for example, Directive 2009/16/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on port 
state control Official Journal L131/57 (28.5.2009) (related to compliance of ships with international standards for 
safety, pollution prevention and on-board living and working conditions and taking a broad view regarding 
unseaworthiness), Article 19(2) Rectification and detention. This provision relates to international standards but 
similar measures are provided for ships flying the flag of states not party to a relevant convention: “substantial 
compliance with the provisions is required before the ship sails” (Annex X, 3.1).  
Also EU Regulation No 2244/2003 of 18 December 2003 laying down detailed provisions regarding satellite-
based vessel monitoring systems, Official Journal L333/17 (20.12.2003) Article 23(3):  
A third-country vessel operating in Community waters shall not leave a port of a Member State, 
following a technical failure or non-functioning, before the satellite tracking device fitted on board is 
functioning to the satisfaction of the competent authorities or before it is otherwise authorised to leave by 
the competent authorities.  
See also prohibition of exit until rectification of deficiencies with respect to non-static requirements in Directive 
2000/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2000 on port reception facilities for 
ship-generated waste and cargo residues Official Journal L332/81 (28.12.2000) (article 11(2)(c)) and Directive 
1999/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 concerning the enforcement of 
provisions in respect of seafarers' hours of work on board ships calling at Community ports Official Journal L14/29 
(20.1.2000) (article 5(1-2)).   
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on considerations related to the purpose and effect of the requirement – which courts, as 
demonstrated by the Sellers Case, might not be prepared to ignore.   
2. Requirements related to the operation of the vessel and other activities   
(i) Monitoring and provision of information related to activities taking place outside 
a state’s jurisdiction 
 
National laws providing for the monitoring of activities outside the state’s maritime zones or 
requiring the provision of relevant information have been used as part of port state control and 
jurisdiction to tackle marine pollution and illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing. 
These measures take two forms: first, a requirement of the use of Vessel Monitoring Systems 
(VMS) or similar monitoring and surveillance systems by vessels, and second, an obligation to 
collect information extraterritorially and to report when in port.  
Requirements for VMS systems are increasingly common especially within the framework 
of tackling IUU fishing.83 A number of regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) 
require fishing vessels of contracting and cooperating non-contracting parties to be equipped 
with such systems and comply with related reporting obligations.84 Similar systems have been 
required for safety purposes.85 While requirements for such equipment is a static feature and 
covered by territorial jurisdiction, as examined in the previous subsection, requiring transiting 
fishing vessels (or support vessels e.g., engaged in bunkering) in the EEZ or fishing vessels on 
                                                          
83 See U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, article 7(7) (3) 
available on the FAO website, at <www.fao.org>; FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, para. 24, on the FAO website, and the Agreement for the 
Implementation of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Fish Stocks Agreement), 2167 U.N.T.S. 3, article 18. See 
generally M-A. Palma, M. Tsamenyi and W. Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries The International Legal and 
Policy Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (Brill, 2010), p. 220-222.  
84 See Palma, et al., supra note 83, p. 220-222. 
85 See for example, See Directive 2002/59 establishing a Community vessel traffic monitoring and information 
system and repealing Council Directive 93/75/EEC Official Journal L 208/10 (27.06.2002) which at the time of its 
enactment went beyond international rules and specifically SOLAS Regulation V/20 on Voyage Data Recorders. 
See H.Ringbom (2008), supra note 49, p. 263-4. 
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the high seas to have the VMS on or to report in live time (by radio, telex, etc.) entails a non-
static extraterritorial element which cannot as such be justified under the territorial principle of 
jurisdiction.86  
Port states have expanded the use of VMS within their maritime zones but have 
demonstrated caution with respect to monitoring vessels on the high seas.87 In some RFMOs, 
VMS systems on the high seas areas within their competence are operated in a centralised way 
by established bodies (i.e., Commissions),88 but this only concerns party members and 
cooperating states. The EU Regulation No 2244/2003 is indicative in this respect.89 The 
Regulation provides that Fisheries Monitoring Centres will monitor “third country fishing 
vessels during the time they are in the waters under the sovereignty or the jurisdiction of that 
member state” (article 3 (2) (c)) and that “a third-country fishing vessel subject to VMS shall 
have an operational satellite-tracking device installed on board when it is in community waters” 
(article 17).90 However, there is no obligation upon these vessels to ensure the VMS system is in 
operation when outside the maritime zones of member states.  
                                                          
86 E.J. Molenaar and M. Tsamenyi, “Satellite-based Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMSs) for fisheries management: 
International Legal Aspects and Developments in State Practice,” FAO Legal Papers online (2000) p. 44, at 
<www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/lpo7.pdf>, note that port states would not have a basis of 
jurisdiction to require such ships (foreign vessels without fishing licenses) to have these systems switched on prior 
to entry into port, but point out that “various indications exist that states and RFMOs are probing the limits of 
international law, in particular with regard to port state jurisdiction.”  
87 U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 83, article 18(3)(g) (iii) refers to VMS as the responsibility of the flag 
state.  
88 Western Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, Conservation and Management Measure 2014-02, Commission 
Vessel Monitoring Scheme, on the WCPFC website, at <www.wcpfc.int>. The VMS system applies to “all fishing 
vessels that fish for highly migratory fish stocks on the high seas within the Convention Area” (article 6 (a)).  
89 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2244/2003 of 18 December 2003 laying down detailed provisions regarding 
satellite-based Vessel Monitoring Systems, supra note 82.  
90 Ibid. To what extent these measures are in line with the coastal state’s jurisdiction in the EEZ or a potential 
violation of freedom of navigation may be questioned. However, restrictions on the navigation rights of fishing 
vessels seem to have been accepted in state practice as being within the framework of the coastal state’s sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction for the management of resources in the EEZ; see discussion in J.M.Van Dyke, ‘The 
disappearing right to navigational freedom in the Exclusive Economic Zone’ 29 Marine Policy (2005), p. 108-109.   
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With respect to the obligation to monitor and provide information, which may take various 
forms, such as recording the required information and retaining on board log books or documents 
evidencing the information, or reporting of information before entry. is the former is common 
with respect to fisheries, where catch-related data is required in order to confirm that the fish 
found on a vessel was not caught in the EEZ of RFMOs’ member states or on the high seas in 
contravention to conservation measures.91 Such laws are normally applied indiscriminately, 
regardless of whether the flag state is bound by RFMO rules.92 Reporting of information 
regarding the cargo before entry has been used as part of safety-related measures aiming at 
protecting the marine environment.93 An interesting recent example of regulation regarding 
reporting going beyond international standards is EU Regulation 2015/75794 which requires 
ship-owners, or other persons responsible for the operation of a ship, to monitor and report the 
carbon dioxide emissions for each ship above 5000 gross tonnage both on a per-voyage and on 
an annual basis and carry on board the relevant certification for inspection by the port state and 
submit an emissions report concerning the emissions and other climate-relevant information 
                                                          
91 See, for example, Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), 
Conservation measure 10-05 (2014) Catch Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp, available on the CCAMLR 
website, at <www.ccamlr.org>, which provides that each landing at a port needs to be accompanied by catch 
document with specific information with the view to identifying the origin of toothfish but also to determining 
whether the toothfish was harvested in a manner consistent with CCAMLR conservation measures (article 2). See 
also EU Regulation No 1005/2008, establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, 
unreported and unregulated Fishing, Article 12. For an overview of the relevant measures, see Palma et al., supra 
note 83, p. 226-7.  
92 M. Hayashi, “Regional Fisheries Management Organisations and non-members,” in T.M. Diaye and R. Wolfrum 
(eds.) Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes: Liber Amicorum Judge Th.A. Mensah 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), p. 756-7. 
93. See, for example, Directive 2002/59/EC of 27 June 2002 establishing a Community vessel traffic monitoring and 
information system and repealing Council Directive 93/75/EEC, article 13(2) which requires that vessels notify EU 
ports of any dangerous or polluting goods on board before arrival at the latest upon departure from the loading port. 
This requirement is outside the scope of SOLAS Regulation V/11 on Ship Reporting Systems  
94 Regulation (EU) 2015/757 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on the monitoring, 
reporting and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport, and amending Directive 
2009/16/EC, Official Journal L 123/55 (19.5.2015). 
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during the entire reporting period. This Regulation applies ‘in a non-discriminatory manner to all 
ships regardless of their flag’ (paragraph 14 of Preamble).   
Two types of extraterritorial elements can be observed: vessels are required to collect such 
information when outside a state’s maritime zones and/or they need to notify the port state when 
outside a state’s territorial sea.95 In both instances, a certain (extraterritorial) behaviour of the 
vessel is required (and thus regulated) by the port state.96 These measures do not appear to have 
been subjected to challenges or public protests.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has made pronouncements regarding the extraterritoriality of such 
operational measures. These cases did not concern extraterritoriality in international law, rather 
they involved the constitutional allocation of jurisdictional competences between the federal 
government and the states in their adjacent maritime area. Nevertheless, they have some 
relevance in terms of the scope of territorial jurisdiction. In these cases, the state-imposed 
measures were challenged for, inter alia, exceeding the territorial jurisdiction (3-n. miles) of the 
state. In Intertanko v Lowry, Intertanko objected “to the requirements that owners report 
hazardous events even if the events occur outside of Washington” and other operational 
requirements.97 The U.S. Supreme Court accepted that “while some of these activities are likely 
to occur outside of Washington, such occurrences are not mandated” and stressed that “some 
incidental impact on extraterritorial activities is permitted to protect state resources”.98 It 
                                                          
95 See Marten, supra note 1, p. 106 and H. Ringbom (2008), supra note 49, p. 253-6. 
96 The Legal Committee of the IMO noted that mandatory ship reporting was in line with the LOSC when the vessel 
was in the territorial sea and in the EEZ but not when on the high seas. IMO Doc LEG 67/8/1, 12 August 1992, 
“Legal issues regarding mandatory ship reporting systems and vessel traffic services,” Note by the Secretariat, 
Annex paras 44-46.  




concluded that “rather, the oil spill prevention laws legitimately protect Washington’s delicate 
and valuable marine resources through the exercise of the state’s police powers”.99  
However, in contrast to CDEM requirements, which are static in nature, the extraterritorial 
element of information requirements is not incidental, as the legislation would pose an obligation 
upon the vessel to collect or report such information when outside the state’s maritime zones. 
The breach, however, arises in the port when the vessel is found to have provided either false or 
no information. Despite the extraterritorial element, state practice indicates that there is a 
jurisdictional link with the port state. This is often connected with the right of entry. With respect 
to fisheries, for example, entry of fishing vessels into the ports is authorised when the vessel has 
provided such information, should the information be found to be false, the state can take 
enforcement measures. States have been more cautious with direct extraterritorial regulation for 
example, requiring the use of VMS in areas outside a state’s maritime zone. 
(ii) Measures related to fishing and fishing-related activities   
The possibility of port measures related to fishing activities, including as regards IUU fishing, 
has been recognised in international agreements, such as the 1995 U.N. Fish Stocks 
Agreement100 and the 2009 Port State Measures Agreement101 (not yet in force) and soft-law 
documents adopted by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).102 The substantive 
regulatory objective of port measures relate to activities and protection of living resources on the 
high seas and may have an extraterritorial effect. Article 23(3) of the Fish Stocks Agreement 
provides for the adoption of measures “where it has been established that the catch has been 
                                                          
99 Ibid. Similarly, Intertanko v Locke, 148 F.3d 1053 para. 84.  
100 U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 83, article 23. 
101 Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, 
22 November 2009, on the FAO website, supra note 83. 
102 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, supra note 83, and International Plan of Action to Prevent, 
Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing, supra note 83.  
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taken in a manner which undermines the effectiveness of subregional, regional or global 
conservation and management measures on the high seas”. However, there is no direct 
enforcement (punitive) measures related to the activities on the high seas. Molenaar regrets this: 
“as regards extraterritorial port state jurisdiction, it is unfortunate that an opportunity was missed 
to progressively develop international law by explicitly empowering port states to impose 
punitive measures modelled on article 218 of LOSC”.103 The prescriptive and enforcement 
measures in the Fish Stocks Agreement and the Port State Measures Agreement provide for 
notification before entry, denial of entry, inspections and prohibition of landings and 
transhipments and other port services.104 However, the Fish Stocks Agreement acknowledges the 
sovereignty of the port state,105 and can be interpreted to denote that states can adopt more 
stringent measures as long as they are consistent with international law.106 The Port State 
Measures Agreement is more explicit in recognising:  
the exercise by parties of their sovereignty over ports in their territory in accordance 
with international law, including their right to deny entry thereto as well as to adopt 
more stringent port state measures than those provided for in this agreement, 
including such measures adopted pursuant to a decision of a regional fisheries 
management organisation.107  
 
There is uncertainty regarding the enforcement measures states can adopt especially with 
respect to more intrusive measures and this may be related to the potential extraterritorial reach. 
                                                          
103 E.J. Molenaar, “Port state jurisdiction to combat IUU fishing: the Port State Measures Agreement” in D.A. 
Russell and D.L. VanderZwaag, (eds.) Recasting Transboundary Fisheries Management Arrangements in Light of 
Sustainability Principles (Martinus Nijhoff, 2010), p. 386. 
104 U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 83, article 23 and Port State Measures Agreement, supra note 101, 
articles 8-11 and 18.  
105 Ibid., article 23(4).  
106 Molenaar, supra note 103, p. 381.  Rose and Tsamenyi, supra note 51, p. 72, argue that “these measures could 
conceivably include vessel detention and the seizure of catch and/or gear” and that “beyond the provisions of the 
PSM-IUU Agreement civil penalties and criminal prosecutions of vessels breaching the conditions of entry are 
within the power of the port state.”  
107 Port State Measures Agreement, supra note 101, article 4(1)(b) and see also article 18(3). See also “A Guide to 
the background and implementation of the 2009 FAO Agreement on port state measures to prevent, deter and 
eliminate IUU fishing,” FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circ., No 1074, p. 60, on the FAO website, supra note 83, 
where it is stated that: “a party is at liberty to take additional measures, as long as they are in conformity with 
international law. … Such actions may include initiating legal proceedings against the vessel”.  
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However, it should be noted that these measures apply to all states indiscriminately.108 States and 
RFMOs require states to notify them in advance of their intention to enter the port and engage in 
activities such as landing and transhipment.109 They also require authorisation for entry and 
authorisation for landing/transhipment based on the information received.110 Others also require 
a declaration that vessels have not engaged in IUU fishing or related activities as a condition of 
entry or use of port facilities.111 With respect to enforcement measures, most states and RFMOs 
deny access to their ports and port facilities especially with respect to landing and 
transhipment.112 Vessels have also been excluded from other services such as refuelling or re-
supplying.113 Besides denial of entry and facilities, some RFMOs have indicated that states can 
criminalise activities taking place in the port (such as landing, transhipment or even possession 
of fish) due to the violation of conservation measures on the high seas.114 What is more, some 
RFMOs and some states have taken steps to adopt more stringent measures with respect to IUU 
fishing on the high seas. For example, the Commission for Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources (CCAMLR) provides for the confiscation of catch of foreign vessels in the 
ports of member states.115 Some RFMOs have also left open the possibility of further measures 
                                                          
108 See Hayashi, supra note 92, p. 757-8 and Palma, et al., supra note 83, p. 232-4. 
109 See, for example, Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), the 2015 NAFO Conservation and 
enforcement measures (2014), Chapter VII, article 43(2) and 45, available on the NAFO website, at 
<www.nafo.int>. For states, see the FAO port state measures database, on the FAO website, supra note 83.  
110 See, for example, NAFO, ibid., Conservation and enforcement measures, article 43(7). See also Port State 
Measures Agreement, supra note 101, article 9. 
111 CCAMLR, Convention measure 10-03 (2014), para. 4, on the CCAMLR website, supra note 91.  
112 Ibid., article 6 and NAFO Conservation and enforcement measures (2014), supra note 109, article 55. For the 
states which have adopted restrictions on entry and landing and transshipment, see the list provided (and access to 
the relevant provisions) on the FAO port state measures database, supra note 109. 
113 See ibid., article 22 (iv) (b) (ii) and NAFO Conservation and enforcement measures (2014), supra note 109, 
article 55.  
114 See NAFO Chapter V, 2009 NAFO Conservation and enforcement measures (2009), Chapter V, supra note 109, 
on the NAFO website, supra note 109.  
115 CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-07 (2009), Scheme to promote compliance by non-contracting party vessel 
with CCAMLR conservation measures, Paragraph 22 (iv) and see CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-06 (2008) 
para. 18 (v) (a) (b), both available on CCAMLR website, supra note 91. See also: NAFO Conservation and 
enforcement measures, (2015), supra note 109, article 43(7).  
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and enforcement action.116 In this context, the measures adopted by the United States and the EU 
deserve particular mention.  
The United States appears more open in embracing the extraterritorial scope of IUU-
tackling measures. The Lacey Act, the cornerstone of protection of wildlife in the U.S. legal 
system, prohibits and makes it an offence to “import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire or 
purchase any fish or wildlife or plant taken, possessed, transported or sold in violation of any 
law, treaty or regulation of the US or in violation of any Indian tribal law”.117 The Act further 
criminalises the possession of “any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold in 
violation of any law or regulation of any state or in violation of any foreign law or Indian tribal 
law”.118 These offences may relate to activities on the high seas which breach international or US 
law. The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act119 “extends the 
application of US national legislation to areas beyond national jurisdiction and to fisheries which 
are currently unregulated”.120 The Act makes it an unlawful act to “ship, transport, offer for sale, 
sell, purchase, import, export, or have custody, control or possession of, any fish taken or 
retained in violation of this Act” or relevant regulation and “provision of, or regulation under, an 
applicable governing international fishery agreement”.121 This practice goes beyond the 
criminalisation of activities in the port and punishes possession of illegally caught fish. 
                                                          
116 CCAMLR Conservation measure 10-03 (2014), Port inspections of fishing vessels carrying Antarctic Marine 
living resources, article 7, on the CCAMLR website, supra note 91 and NAFO Conservation and enforcement 
measures (2014), supra note 109, article 42 recognising “the right of the port State Contracting Party to impose 
requirements of its own for access to its ports.”  
117 The Lacey Act, para. 3372(a), 18 USC 42-43, 16 USC 3371-3378. 
118 Ibid., para. 3372(a) (3) (A).  
119 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act(Public Law 64-265) as amended by Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorisation Act (Public Law 109-479).  
120 Palma, et al., supra note 83, p. 240. These authors specifically refer to the definition of IUU fishing in 16 USC 
1826j.  
121 Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 USC 1857 (1) (G). 
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Enforcement measures include: civil penalties, liability in rem for any civil penalties, criminal 
penalties, forfeiture of fish and fishing vessels (including fishing gear).122  
The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the validity of regulating the possession of fish even if 
this may impose restrictions on catch harvested outside the territorial scope of legislative 
competence of a U.S. state.123 These cases, while involving the division of powers between the 
U.S. federal government and the U.S. states, are interesting since the U.S. Supreme Court has 
taken the view that these extraterritorial elements are incidental and thus accepted the territorial 
jurisdiction of the state. 124 Justifying the extraterritorial aspect of the regulation, the Court 
stressed the following two aspects: “if boats fishing outside the three-mile limit were not 
included in the permit requirement when they enter Washington waters, it would defeat the 
purpose of the act”,125 and “if this latter power [to regulate fishermen outside California 
territorial waters] were denied to the state, it would clearly result in the practical deprivation to 
the state of its undoubted right to regulate the taking of fish from within its territorial waters”.126 
The Court has upheld extraterritorial jurisdiction of a U.S. state in cases of fisheries jurisdiction 
by invoking the effects doctrine.127 Interestingly, in the Weeren Case, the California Supreme 
Court noted that “California had powerful interest in preserving its fisheries and that such an 
interest extended beyond its borders because fish swim and do not otherwise respect the borders 
drawn by governmental entities”.128 
                                                          
122 Ibid., 16 USC, 1858-61. See also Lacey Act, supra note 117, 16 USC 3373 which provides for civil and criminal 
penalties, permit sanctions and the forfeiture of fish and of vessels and other equipment used to aid in the violation 
of the Act.  
123 Frach v Schoettler, 46 Wn.2d 281 (1955), 280 P.2d 1038 and Bayside Fish Flour Co v Gentry 297 U.S. 422, 80 
L.Ed 772 (1936).  
124 The U.S. Supreme Court referred to these fisheries cases and drew this conclusion in Intertanko v Lowry, supra 
note 97, p. 288. 
125 Ibid., referring to Frach v Schoettler, supra note 123. 
126 Mirkovich v Milnor, 34 F.Supp. 409 (1940), 412.  
127 For an overview of these cases, see PMSA v Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154, p. 1172-3, (9th Cir. 2011).  
128 People v Weeren, 26 Cal.3d at 658-670 (Crim. No. 21078. Supreme Court of California. March 24, 1980.   
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EU legislation on IUU fishing has a similar scope of extraterritorial application. Regulation 
1005/2008 provides that the “system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing … shall apply to all IUU fishing and associated activities carried out within 
the territory of member states to which the Treaty applies, within Community waters, within 
maritime waters under the jurisdiction or sovereignty of third countries and on the high seas”.129 
Among other aspects, a fishing vessel is presumed to be engaged in IUU fishing if it has:  
carried out fishing activities in the area of a regional fisheries management 
organisation in a manner inconsistent with or in contravention of the conservation 
and management measures of that organisation and is flagged to a state not party to 
that organisation, or not cooperating with that organisation as established by that 
organisation.130 
 
The Regulation requires notification and authorisation of entry and landing/transhipment, 
catch certificates and provides for denial of entry or use of port services.131 Avoiding direct 
extraterritorial application, the Regulation relies on flag state cooperation and consent and does 
not include an LOSC article-218-like provision. Article 11 (4) provides:  
where the suspected breach has taken place in the high seas, the port member state 
shall cooperate with the flag state in carrying out an investigation into it and, where 
appropriate, shall apply the sanctions provided for by the legislation of that port 
member state, under the condition that, in accordance with international law, that 
flag state has expressly agreed to transfer its jurisdiction.132  
 
Only when the violation of the preservation measures on the high seas is linked to activities in 
port, does the Regulation provide for a variety of enforcement measures including “effective, 
                                                          
129 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing Official Journal L 286/1 (29.10.2008), article 1(3). Also article 3, para 7 of 
preamble of this Regulation states: “In line with the definition of IUU fishing, the scope of this Regulation should 
extend to fishing activities carried out on the high seas ...”. The EU adopted the scope and nature of IUU fishing as 
set out in the FAO IPOA-IUU, supra note 83.  
Concerning the Regulation, see M. Tsamenyi, et al., “The European Council Regulation on IUU Fishing: an 
international fisheries law perspective,” 25 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2010), 5-31. See also 
Commission Regulation No 1010/2009 of 22 October 2009 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of 
Council Regulation No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing, Official Journal L 280/5 (27.10.2009). 
130 Ibid., article 3(1)(k). 
131 Ibid., articles 4-22. 
132 Ibid. See also article 41(3) and 42(2) regarding enforcement measures.  
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proportionate and dissuasive” administrative and criminal sanctions, and confiscation of “fishing 
gear, catches or fishery products”.133  
The application of such measures vis-à-vis third states has been confirmed by the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU) in the Poulsen Case,134 which concerned the challenge of the 
prosecution of Poulsen, the master of Onkel Sam, and Diva Navigation, its owner, for breaches 
arising from Council Regulation No 3094/86.135 This regulation provided for certain technical 
measures for the conservation of fishery resources and specifically article 6 provided that salmon 
and sea trout caught outside the “waters under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the member 
states” “may not be retained on board, transhipped, landed, transported, stored, sold, displayed or 
offered for sale”. This was in line with the Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the 
North Atlantic,136 though the question before the Court concerned non-party states. The CJEU 
recognised that the Salmon Convention cannot be invoked directly against third state vessels,137 
but pointed out that “community legislation may be applied to [a vessel] when it sails in the 
inland waters or, more especially, is in a port of a member state, where it is generally subject to 
the unlimited jurisdiction of that state”.138 The CJEU justified this on the basis of territorial 
jurisdiction, similarly to the ATA Case to be discussed below, without, however, discussing that 
the regulated actions (including retention on board) related to the way fish were caught on the 
high seas.  
                                                          
133 See ibid., Chapter IX and more specifically articles 43 (immediate enforcement measures) and 44 (sanctions for 
serious infringements). 
134 Case C-286/90, Anklagemyndigheden [Public Prosecutor] v Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp., 
Judgment of the Court, 25 November 1992, European Court Reports 1992-I-06019. [SOURCE] 
135 Council Regulation No. 3094/86 of 27 June 1994 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources in the Mediterranean, Official Journal L171/1 (6.7.1994) [SOURCE] 
136 Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic, 2 March 1982, 1338 U.N.T.S. 33. 
137 Poulsen Case, supra note 134, para. 23.  
138 Ibid., para. 28. Also at para. 33: “since the prohibition on transporting and storing salmon caught in the areas 
mentioned in Article 6(1)(b) of the Regulation can in principle be applied to a vessel registered in a non-member 
country only when the vessel is in the inland waters or in the port of a MS [member state], confiscation of the cargo 
temporarily transported into waters under Community jurisdiction may be ordered only in that situation.” 
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A rather different approach was advanced by the EU in its dispute with Chile over the 
prohibition by the latter of landing and transhipment of swordfish in Chilean ports by fishing 
vessels engaged in fishing activities in contravention of regionally-prescribed rules on the high 
seas.139 In the dispute submitted to a Special Chamber of International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea (ITLOS) by an agreement concluded between Chile and the EU, the EU challenged the 
Chilean Decree on the basis of its (alleged) breach of articles 87, 89 and 116 to 119 LOSC as it 
purported to apply unilateral conservation measures relating to swordfish on the high seas.140 
These measures were also challenged on the basis of a breach of article 300 (good faith and 
abuse of right). Chile argued in favour of its sovereign right and duty “as a coastal state, to 
prescribe measures within its national jurisdiction for the conservation of swordfish and to 
ensure their implementation in its ports, in a non-discriminatory manner”.141 Chile and the EU 
concluded a provisional arrangement and expressed their commitment to negotiate an agreement, 
which led to a discontinuance of the ITLOS case.142 This dispute demonstrates the potential 
extraterritorial elements of port state measures regulating fishing on the high seas.  
Despite the fact that national legislation regulates fishing-related actions which take place 
in port, such as transhipment, the legality of these actions depends on the activity on the high 
seas, and in this sense it can be said that a port state extends its legislative jurisdiction 
                                                          
139 Article 165 of the Chilean Fishery Law (Ley General de Pesca y Acuicultura), as consolidated by the Supreme 
Decree 430 of 28 September 1991, and extended by Decree 598 of 15 October 1999. [SOURCE available at 
http://faolex.fao.org/cgi-
bin/faolex.exe?rec_id=000190&database=faolex&search_type=link&table=result&lang=spa&format_name=@SRA
LL (in Spanish). 
140 Case concerning the conservation and sustainable exploitation of swordfish stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific 
Ocean (Chile/EU) List of cases 7, Order of 20th December 2000, para. 2, on the website of the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), at <www.itlos.org>. 
141 Ibid.  
142 Case concerning the conservation and sustainable exploitation of swordfish stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific 
Ocean (Chile/EU), ITLOS, Order of 15 December 2009, on the ITLOS website, supra note 140. 
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extraterritorially.143 Criminalisation of possession without any activity by the vessel also 
manifests the long-arm of the jurisdiction. The exercise of jurisdiction is based on carefully-
drafted provisions in national legislation ensuring that the breach arises in port (i.e., entry 
without authorisation or notification, false information in declaration related to entry, 
introduction of illegally-caught fish). Uncertainty exists as to the spectrum of enforcement 
measures, but it seems that increasingly (and without public protests) more intrusive measures 
such as fines, confiscation and detention are being used.  
(iii) Compulsory pilotage and Vessel Traffic Schemes 
Measures regulating maritime traffic in areas where the coastal state does not have the relevant 
jurisdiction have been enacted as port entry requirements. Australian attempts to incorporate 
compulsory pilotage as a protective measure in the Particularly Sensitive Sea Area established in 
the Torres Strait144 (an international strait) have been opposed by some states as a violation of 
the LOSC and customary international law related to transit passage.145 The compromise reached 
mainly between Australia and the USA concerned the enforcement of the requirement for 
compulsory pilotage in the Torres Strait only for vessels entering Australian ports.146 According 
to Section 59C of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 it is an “offence to enter an 
Australian port after navigating without a pilot if a regulated ship navigates without a pilot in the 
                                                          
143 G. deBaere and C. Ryngaert, “The ECJ’s judgment in ATA and the international legal context of the EU’s 
climate change policy”, 18 European Foreign Affairs Review (2013), p. 406. 
144 IMO, Resolution MEPC.133(53), 22 July 2005, “Designation of the Torres Strait as an Extension of the Great 
Barrier Reef Particularly Sensitive Sea,” MEPC 53/24/Add 2, Annex 21, available on the Australian Maritime 
Safety Authority, at <www.amsa.gov.au>. 
145 See D.R. Rothwell, “Compulsory pilotage and the law of the sea: lessons learned from the Torres Strait,” ANU 
College of Law Research Paper No. 12-06, p. 15-6, at <ssrn.com/abstract=2020781> or 
<dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2020781>.  
146 For the revised Australian position see Australian Maritime Safety Authority, Bridge Resource Management 
(BRM) and Torres Strait Pilotage, Marine Notice 7/2009. For the compromise see D.R.Rothwell, supra note 145, p. 
16-7, and H.Caminos and V.P.Cogliati-Batz, The Legal Regime of Straits: Contemporary Challenges and Solutions 
(CUP, 2014), p. 433-436.  
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compulsory pilotage area”.147 The United States, which had protested the imposition of 
compulsory pilotage in the Torres Strait as an infringement upon the right of transit passage, has 
noted that ‘the international legal basis for enforcing the system of pilotage in the Torres Strait is 
as a condition for entry into an Australian port and that compliance with this system is as 
recommended by the IMO’.148 It is also interesting to note that the entry into the port does not 
have to be immediately following the passage, it can relate to a different voyage. Similarly, the 
EU in Directive 2002/59 requires all vessels heading for a port of a member state to comply with 
Vessel Traffic System (VTS) rules in areas outside its territorial sea.149  The Directive does not 
specify the sanctions for breach of these requirements but leaves it to the states to adopt 
“effective, proportionate and dissuasive” measures.150 The extraterritorial element – regulation of 
activity outside a state’s territory – is obvious in both cases: the offence is committed in the port 
when the vessel enters, but the regulated activity is behaviour beyond state jurisdiction though it 
is tied directly to a vessel entering national waters. 
(iv) Air pollution and emissions standards 
Emissions from ships have also been the target of port states. California introduced an ambitious 
system requiring vessels within 24-n. miles off its coast to use cleaner marine fuels (fuel could 
                                                          
147 Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975, Act No. 85 of 1973, Section 59 C.  
148 MEPC 61/24 Annex 15 (2010). See also J.T. Oliver, “Legal and policy factors governing the imposition of 
conditions on access to and jurisdiction over foreign-flag vessels in US ports,” 5 South Carolina Journal of 
International Law and Business, 209 (2008-2009), p. 290. This author examines whether this extraterritorial 
exercise of jurisdiction met a number of criteria mainly based on reasonableness and balance of interests. Singapore 
which protested against compulsory pilotage in the strait noted the extraterritorial regulation of the port measure: 
‘By threatening criminal action against parties who fail to take on pilotage whilst transiting the Torres Strait when 
the ship next calls at an Australian port, the effectively continues to treat pilotage for transit vessels as compulsory. 
If a right of transit passage exists, action by a state party to criminalise the proper exercise of that right by a vessel is 
wholly inconsistent with giving effect to that right, even if it cannot immediately enforce such legislation. It has the 
effect of denying or impairing that right because any vessel which chooses to act inconsistently with the marine 
Notice faces the threat of domestic prosecution’ IMO Doc MEPC 55/23 (2006) Annex 22, Statement by Singapore. 
149 Directive 2002/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2002 establishing a Community 
vessel traffic monitoring and information system and repealing Council Directive 93/75/EEC, Official Journal L 
208/10 (5.8.2002), article 8(b). 
150 Ibid., article 25. 
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not exceed 0.1 per cent sulphur).151 This was challenged by the Pacific Merchant Shipping 
Association (PMSA) on the grounds of its unconstitutionality related to the division of powers 
between the U.S. states and the federal government with reference to the Submerged Land 
Act,152 which also raised interesting jurisdictional issues with respect to the regulation of fuel 
beyond the territorial sea.153 Both the U.S. District Court and the Court of Appeal (9th Circuit) 
rejected the challenge regarding the pre-emption of the state’s regulation by the federal 
Submerged Lands Act and relied on the “effects test” to justify California’s exercise of 
jurisdiction.154 The Court of Appeal admitted that “the regulatory scheme at issue here pushes a 
state’s legal authority to its very limits, although the state had clear justifications for doing 
so”.155 By referring to relevant case law in relation to the effects test, it found that “California 
may enact reasonable regulations to monitor and control extraterritorial conduct substantially 
affecting its territory”.156 The reasonableness and justifiability of the measures was based on the 
“severe environmental problems confronting California”,157 the “specific environmental 
impacts” arising from the activities and that the adopted regulation would “significantly reduce 
these harmful effects”.158 The close connection with the state was also stressed: “we are also 
                                                          
151 For an overview of the scheme and background information see S.P. Broder and J.M. Van Dyke, “The urgency of 
reducing air pollution from global shipping,” in A. Chircop, et al. (eds.) The Regulation of International Shipping: 
International and Comparative Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), p. 278-284. 
152 U.S. Submerged Land Act, 43 U.S.C. 1301 et seq. 
153 PMSA v Goldstene, supra note 127. See also Broder and Van Dyke, supra note 150, p. 279-280. One of the main 
questions was to what extent the specific authority of the state was pre-empted by the Submerged Land Act.  
154 Ibid., p. 1170. 
155 Ibid., p.1162. 
156 Ibid., p. 1170. At p. 1174-5 the Court found that “a state law regulating extraterritorial conduct in the high seas 
immediately adjacent to the state’s territorial waters satisfying the well-established effects test should generally be 
sustained.”  
J. Hammitt, “Who’s afraid of the supremacy clause? State regulation of air pollution from offshore ships is 
upheld in Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene,” 66 University of Miami Law Review (2001), p. 70, 
criticizes the application of the effects doctrine due to the lack of intention to cause harm and the broad spectrum of 
allowed regulation “allowing a state to regulate based on remote repercussions of lawful activity wholly performed 
outside the state’s territory could potentially provide nearly limitless regulatory power.”  
157 Ibid., p. 1181-2. 
158 Ibid., p. 1175-6.  
35 
 
confronted with a state regulatory scheme applicable to the high sea waters immediately adjacent 
to the state itself”.159 The Court admitted that the costs to the shipping industry appears to be 
quite significant but noted that “MPSA still fails to show the absence of any genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to the regulations’ impact on commerce and navigation”.160 The Court 
also stressed the existence of steps and attempts at the international level to tackle this problem 
and noted that the Californian regulations would soon be in line with IMO regulations.161  
Similarly, the EU enacted Directive 2012/33/EU on sulphur content of marine fuels which 
applies to the territorial sea, EEZ or pollution control zones of member states including SOx 
Emission Control Areas.162 Some of its requirements and standards go beyond international 
standards.163 Since a coastal state does not have relevant jurisdiction in areas beyond its 
territorial sea, port state enforcement cannot be based on the jurisdiction over vessels provided 
for in LOSC article 220(1).164 Enforcement in port may rely on entry requirements, however, the 
Directive does not prescribe the specific measures as an entry requirement but seems to assume 
that legislative jurisdiction in the EEZ is enforced in the ports. Sanctions for breach of the 
requirements are not set out in the Directive and are left to member states to determine, but the 
                                                          
159 Ibid., p. 1175. The Court noted the difference with “an attempt to regulate ships in Shanghai Harbor because of 
their effects on global climate change.” 
160 Ibid., p. 1176. 
161 Ibid., p. 1160-1, 1180. The U.S. and Canada’s proposal for an emission control area (ECA) to be established 200 
nm off their coasts, with the same standard to the Californian rules, was adopted in 2010. Annex 11, Resolution 
MEPC.190 (60), 26 March 2010, North America Emission Control Area, IMO, MEPC 60122, Annex II, on the IMO 
website, supra note 69.  
162 Directive 2012/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 amending Council 
Directive 1999/32/EC as regards the sulphur content of marine fuels, Official Journal L 327/1 (27.11.2012). 
163 See, for example, ibid., article 4 on passenger vessels operating in territorial sea and EEZ. See Ringbom (2008), 
supra note 49, p. 264.  
164 Ringbom (2008), supra note 50, p. 374, invokes various reasons for the legality of the port state measures and 
argues that, from a port state perspective the scope of the EU Directive 2012/33, supra note 162, is in compliance 
with the law of the sea referring to LOSC, supra note 27, article 220(1). This provision, however, necessitates that 
the prescriptive jurisdiction in the territorial sea and EEZ be in line with the LOSC for the port state to assume 
enforcement jurisdiction, which, as admitted by Ringbom, is not the case with 2012 Directive. The same author also 
invokes the international legitimacy of the rule with respect to international standards, the “host state” argument and 
finally the indeterminacy of the enforcement measures, He argues, however, that extension of the requirement to 
cover the high seas would be a major challenge with respect to the justification of a jurisdictional link.  
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Directive requires member states to enforce these requirements “at least in respect of vessels 
flying their flag and vessels of all flags while in their ports”.165  
Port states are increasingly claiming a role in the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions as evidenced by the EU climate policy.166 Jurisdiction implications are bound to 
arise.167 Legislation incorporating aviation in the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) has been 
protested by states168 and challenged before the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU).169 According to EU Directive 2008/101,170 airlines operating flights landing or taking 
off from EU airports were required to submit emission allowances for their flights. A number of 
airlines and airline associations challenged the measures taken by the United Kingdom in 
implementing the Directive and argued that the EU was in breach of international law.171 Both 
the CJEU and the Advocate General examined issues related to jurisdiction which are relevant 
for the present discussion.  
The CJEU found that the Directive did not “infringe the principle of territoriality … since 
those aircrafts are physically in the territory of one of the Member States of the EU and are thus 
                                                          
165 Article 4a(4) of Directive 2012/33/EC supra note 162.  
166 EU Regulation on carbon dioxide emissions and maritime transport, (2015), supra note 94. 
167 A.Miola et al., “Regulating Air Emissions from Ships The State of the Art on Methodologies, Technologies and 
Policy Options” (2010), p. 41, at <ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/default/files/jrc_reference_report_2010_11_ships_ 
emissions.pdf>. 
168 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Council, 194th Session, Summary minutes of the Second 
Meeting, C-MIN 194/2 and Declaration in Annex, on the ICAO website at <www.icao.int>.  See also Joint letter of 
United States, Australia, Canada, China, Japan, and South Korea transmitted to the European Union on April 6, 
2007, Digest of United States Practice in International Law 2007, (Oxford University Press), p. 692-94 and Letter 
from K. Silverberg, U.S. Ambassador to the EU to J. Delbeke, EU Acting Director General for Environment 
(October 30, 2008), Digest of United States Practice in International Law 2008, (Oxford University Press), p. 686-8. 
169 C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America (ATA) and Others v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2011. European Court Reports 2011-I.  
170 Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within 
the Community, Official Journal L 8/3 (13.01.2009). 
171 See “Written observations of the IATA and the National Airlines Council of Canada at ATA Case,” at 
<www.airlinecouncil.ca/pdf/EU%20ETS%20Legal%20Challenge%20IATA-
NACC%20Brief_FINAL%20(21%20Oct%202010).pdf>. They stressed that the extraterritorial application of the 
Directive contravened territorial jurisdiction and expanded legislative jurisdiction on the high seas (para. 147-152) 
and breached, among other issues, customary international law with respect to the non-subjection of the high seas to 
the exclusive sovereignty of a state (paras. 147-157). 
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subject on that basis to the unlimited jurisdiction of the EU”.172 The CJEU stressed the fact that 
the Directive covered the airlines voluntarily landing in the EU and implied that operators could 
choose not to “operate a commercial air route” using EU airports.173 It further stressed the 
capacity of a state to impose conditions for the performance of a certain commercial activity, i.e., 
air transport in its territory, but also emphasised that these conditions relate to criteria “designed 
to fulfil the environmental protection objectives which it has set for itself, in particular where 
those objectives follow on from an international agreement to which the EU is a signatory, such 
as the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol”.174 The CJEU did not 
regard the existence of an extraterritorial element in the regulated activity as having an impact on 
the exercise of territorial jurisdiction, commenting that just because “certain matters contributing 
to the pollution of the air, sea or land territory of the member states originate in an event which 
occurs partly outside that territory is not such as to call into question … the full applicability of 
EU law in that territory”.175 This is as far as the CJEU commented on extraterritoriality in the 
assessment of the Directive in the light of customary international law.176 Advocate General 
Kokott’s opinion – reaching the same conclusion – was more nuanced. On one hand, she pointed 
out that the Directive did not seek to regulate activities of airlines in areas beyond the airspace of 
the EU and thus the Directive did not have any extraterritorial effect.177 She admitted that “to 
                                                          
172 ATA Case, supra note 168, para. 125.  
173 Ibid., para 127. 
174 Ibid., para. 128. B. Mayer, “Case C-266/10, ATA and others v Secretary of state for Energy and Climate Change, 
Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2011” 49 Common Market Law Review (2012), 
p. 1130, stresses the importance of the objective of the Directive with  respect to its reasonableness and argues that 
this was implied in paras. 128-9 of the Judgment. 
175 Ibid., para. 129.  
176 A. Gattini, “Between splendid isolation and tentative imperialism: the EU’s extension of its Emission Trading 
Scheme to international aviation and the ECJ’s judgment in the ATA case” 61 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly (2012), p. 982, noted that “it is striking that the Court did not use any other of the arguments …, which 
the Advocate General had advanced in order to buttress the credibility of the territoriality approach.”  
177 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott  delivered on 6 October 2011, European Court Reports 2011-I. She argued 
at para. 145 that “Directive 2008/101 does not give rise to any kind obligation on airlines to fly their aircraft on 
certain routes, to observe specific speed limits or to comply with certain limits on fuel consumption and exhaust 
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some extent, account is thus taken of events that take place over the high seas or on the territory 
of third states” but even if airlines may conduct themselves in a particular way when over the 
high seas or on the territory of third states, “the Directive does not contain any concrete rule 
regarding their conduct within airspace outside the EU”.178  
There is no doubt that there is an extraterritorial element in the 2008 Directive. The 
calculation of the allowance is based on the distance between the airport of departure and the 
airport of arrival on the basis of the formula: tonne-kilometres = distance x payload. The exercise 
of jurisdiction in the form of a requirement of submission of allowance is based on activities 
(flying) outside its territory.179 The question is whether this extraterritorial element negates the 
territorial link necessary to substantiate territorial jurisdiction. Both the CJEU and AG Kokott 
found that the physical presence of the aircraft in the territory of the EU provided “an adequate 
territorial link”.180 The CJEU relied on the unlimited jurisdiction of the (port) state. AG Kokott 
explained that the territorial principle can apply in instances where activities have taken place 
outside the state exercising jurisdiction, and provided examples the regulation of income tax (for 
income earned in a third country), jurisdiction over antitrust activities, and fisheries.181  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
gases” and continued in para. 147: “the fact that the calculation of emission allowances to be surrendered is based on 
the whole flight in each case does not bestow upon Directive 2008/101 any extraterritorial effect.” 
178 Ibid., para. 147. 
179 J. Scott and L. Rajamani, “EU climate change unilateralism” 23 European Journal of International Law (2012), 
p. 470-1, state that the ETS “includes emission that are generated outside EU airspace and consequently airlines will 
be obliged to surrender emission allowances also for those parts of a flight that take place abroad.” S.M. Dejong, 
“Hot air and hot heads: an examination of the legal arguments surrounding the extension of the European Union’s 
Emissions Trading Scheme to Aviation” 2 Asian Journal of International Law (2013), p. 172, comments that 
“airlines face significant sanctions for failure to comply with the ETS including fines and blacklisting and therefore 
it is a tenuous argument that the ETS does not contain any ‘rules or limits’ on aircraft emissions”.  
180 Opinion of AG Kokott, supra note 177, explicitly concluded that “the EU can rely on the territoriality principle in 
the present case” (para. 15) and pointed out that “the territoriality principle does not prevent account also being 
taken in the application of the EU emissions trading scheme of parts of flights that take place outside the territory of 
the EU” (para. 154)  
181 Ibid., para. 148. 
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Providing support for the existence of the territorial link, AG Kokott also referred to the 
“spirit and purpose of environmental protection and climate change measures” and the effects 
doctrine noting that:  
It is well known that air pollution knows no boundaries and that greenhouse gases 
contribute towards climate change worldwide irrespective of where they are emitted; 
they can have effects on the environment and climate in every state and association 
of states, including the EU.182  
 
It may be suggested that the CJEU also implicitly referred to the effects doctrine within the 
framework of its analysis of the extraterritorial elements of the legislation by citing two cases 
where extraterritorial activities had an effect on the territory of a member state.183 The Court did 
not clarify how these cases where relevant in the context of the ATA Case or how the effects 
from aviation emissions were felt in the territory of the member states.184   
The reasoning of the CJEU, especially its playing-down of extraterritoriality and its 
reluctance to engage more clearly with the extraterritorial elements, has been criticised in 
academic literature. Authors have rejected the Court’s application of the territorial principle on 
account of the extraterritoriality of the Directive.185 These arguments are interlinked with the 
alleged violation of sovereignty over airspace. Opposition to inclusion of aviation in the ETS by 
                                                          
182 Ibid., para. 154.  
183 ATA Case, supra note 169, para. 129, where the Court referred to the Commune de Mesquer and Ahlström 
Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission cases, both of which involved some extraterritorial activities which had an 
effect in the territory of the state. 
184 B.F. Havel and J.Q. Mulligan, “The triumph of politics: reflections on the judgment of the Court of Justice of the 
EU validating the inclusion of non-EU airlines in the Emissions Trading Scheme” Air and Space Law (2012), p. 21-
22, argue: “while there may be a defensible argument that the long term impact of those emissions will have tangible 
effects within EU territory, the distinctions are large enough to warrant a more substantive discussion by the Court 
of which parts of the reasoning in earlier rulings that it finds persuasive.”  
185 Gattini, supra note 175, p. 980 comments: “here the Court’s reasoning assumes ubuesque features in order to 
deny any extraterritorial effect of the Directive”. Havel and Mulligan, supra note 183, p. 18-9, 21 state: “mirroring 
the semantic manipulations of the AG, the Court takes a narrow temporal view of the regulation, suggesting that the 
ETS is only in technical effect while an aircraft is within the EU territory”. G. Plant, “Air Transport Association of 
America v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change,” 107 (1) American Journal of International Law 
(2013), p. 189 states that: “the Court took a particular narrow spatial view of the ETS’s extension to international 
aviation, and failed to mention that the cap (in addition to the obligation to surrender allowances) appears to have 
extraterritorial scope”. See also Dejong, supra note 178, p. 171. 
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states, despite the CJEU judgment upholding its compatibility with jurisdictional principles, 
demonstrates that some states perceive the EU measures to contravene international law, though 
it is not clear whether the states oppose the exercise of jurisdiction or whether the reasons are 
political.186 
Similar reservations with respect to the application of the territorial principle have been 
expressed about the potential inclusion of shipping in the ETS. Some authors have suggested that 
it would be difficult to justify the extraterritorial elements of a regulation on the basis of 
territorial jurisdiction;187 while others have examined the potential application of extraterritorial 
principles with an emphasis on the effects doctrine.188  
IV. Port State Jurisdiction and Protection of Global Commons 
A. Assessment of State Practice and Jurisdictional Principles  
The state practice examined above demonstrates two main elements: expansion of port state 
jurisdiction with respect to measures with extraterritorial application and effect, increasingly 
supported by the use of more intrusive enforcement measures; but also some reticence to endorse 
extraterritoriality more explicitly and directly. There is no attempt to adopt an article-218-LOSC-
like provision which may relate to states’ concerns regarding infringements upon other states’ 
sovereignty. The territorialisation of activities outside a state’s territory has been based upon 
adopting entry requirements referring to these activities or by criminalising related-activities 
                                                          
186 deBaere and Ryngaert, supra note 143, p. 403. 
187 See T. Bauerle, et al., Integration of Marine Transport into the European Emissions Trading System (Umwelt 
Bundesant, 2010), p. 85 and C. Hermeling, et al., “Sailing into a dilemma: an economic and legal analysis of an EU 
trading scheme for maritime emissions,” ZEW Discussion Paper No. 14-021, p. 13-4. To the contrary, see C.E. 
Delft, “Technical Support for European Action to Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Maritime 
Transport” (report 2009), at <www.cedelft.eu>, at 16, argues that the territorial principle can justify such measures 
due to the presence of the vessel in port. Similarly, see A. O’Leary, et al., Legal implications of EU action on GHG 
emission form the international maritime sector (ClientEarth, 2011), p. 20. 
188 See Bauerle, et al., supra note 186, p. 85-87, 96. This study relies on the effects doctrine (as an extension of the 
territorial principle) but distinguishes between the enforcement measures that the state can take in this respect. It 
argues that denial of entry or denial of use of port services will be justified, while the more severe measures such as 
detention or pecuniary penalties cannot be justified due to the weak jurisdictional basis.  
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which take place in the port. However, all the cases entail extraterritorial elements and reflect 
attempts to regulate activities and behaviour outside a state’s territory. Can the extraterritorial 
elements be circumvented in this respect especially when they directly form the objective and 
purpose of the measures? 
Scott distinguishes between “territorial extension of domestic law” and extraterritorial 
jurisdiction per se.189 She uses the term territorial extension to denote that “the application of a 
measure is triggered by a territorial connection but in applying the measure the regulator is 
required as a matter of law, to take into account conduct or circumstances abroad”; while she 
defines extraterritoriality as “the application of a measure triggered by something other than a 
territorial connection with the regulating state”.190 What does this territorial connection entail? 
Would the presence of the vessel in the port justify it?191 Meng argues that the differentiating 
element between extraterritorial regulation and “mere foreign links” is the intention “to have 
coercive effects abroad”.192 According to this author, “coercion is intentionally directed at 
influencing the addressee with respect to the desired behaviour or prohibition”.193 On the other 
hand, territorial jurisdiction entails “those domestic regulations which only have domestic 
connections and legal consequences, but factual effects abroad”.194 Bartels interestingly reverses 
the effects doctrine and identifies two elements which demonstrate extraterritorial jurisdiction: 
“legal connection between the legislation and the extraterritorial subject-matter” and “denial of 
                                                          
189 Scott, supra note 11, p. 90.  
190 Ibid.  
191 Ibid., p. 91, she links presence with the fact that states  
may make access to their territory or the enjoyment of a given status within their territory conditional 
upon compliance with the entirety of their laws. The consequences of this are important but are often 
ignored. If the presence of a person within a state is capable of constituting an autonomous basis for the 
exercise of territorial jurisdiction, this means that territorial jurisdiction may be exercised over natural or 
legal persons who are present even where the conduct in question takes place abroad.  
192 W. Meng, Extraterritoriale Jurisdiktion im öffentlichen Wirtschaftsrecht (Springer, 1994), p. 86 as translated and 
quoted in L. Bartels, “Article XX of GATT and the problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction: The case of trade 





opportunities normally open to the person against whom enforcement is directed”.195 Thus, it is 
important to examine whether the aim and purpose of the relevant legislation is to coerce and 
induce certain extraterritorial behaviour and create legal consequences extraterritorially.196 
Another element which should be borne in mind is that a breach in port only arises due to a 
breach of rules and standards in areas outside a state’s jurisdiction. Without the extraterritorial 
behaviour, there is no territorial offence. This is obvious in all the cases of state practice 
discussed above.  Whether the extraterritorial elements can be justified on the basis of the 
territorial principle may need to be examined on a case-by-case basis, but the mere presence of a 
vessel in the port does not prima facie provide a sufficient territorial jurisdictional link.  
Reliance on entry requirements may provide an opportunity for port states to enhance the 
scope of their jurisdiction especially in instances of protection of the global commons. In 
particular, Marten argues that state practice favours an expansive approach to port state 
jurisdiction based on the right of a state to regulate entry into its ports.197 However, as mentioned 
above, entry requirements and the exercise of jurisdiction in the port following a breach of such 
entry requirements cannot be disassociated from jurisdictional rules. What is more, entry 
requirements have to comply with the principle of good faith and non-abuse of rights which also 
relate to issues of jurisdictional reasonableness, proportionality, and non-encroachment upon the 
rights of other states. In this sense, there is a common denominator underpinning the 
establishment of entry criteria and the exercise of jurisdiction in the form of balancing of 
                                                          
195 Bartels, supra note 191, p. 381-2. 
196 A.V. Lowe, “The Problems of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Economic Sovereignty and the Search for a Solution” 
34 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1985), p. 735, argues that the extraterritorial impact of the 
legislation can be determined by “asking what the measure was in fact intended to achieve.” 
197 B. Marten, supra note 1, p. 233-5. He argues at p. 114 that this may be the preferred way forward: “even though 
finding a well-established basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction for any regulation of vessel operations may be more 
desirable, the lack of any strong authority on this point means that port states are able to slowly extend their 
jurisdiction to cover more and more aspects of such operations with arguments based on territorial jurisdiction.” 
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interests and non-encroachment upon the rights of other states within the framework of justifying 
extraterritoriality. This will be further examined in the section below.  
Emphasis on territoriality is understandable due to the uncertainty related to extraterritorial 
jurisdictional principles and the practicality offered by the location of a vessel in the port with 
respect to enforcement.198  This is in line with a contemporary trend of invocation of the 
territorial principle to justify jurisdiction with respect to activities abroad,199 especially those of a 
transnational nature for which territory plays a minimal role (i.e., cybercrime).200 However, such 
an expansive approach to territoriality is not free from implications and problems.201 First, there 
is uncertainty with respect to what the port state can do within the framework of territorial 
jurisdiction. Emphasis on the intra-territorial activities may limit the scope of the intended 
regulation which is behaviour outside national jurisdiction. This may also relate to the 
enforcement measures that a state can adopt, as demonstrated by fisheries measures. Uncertainty 
may also arise from the legalistic formulation of offences which aim at territorialising activities 
outside a state’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, the exercise of territorial jurisdiction especially based 
on entry requirements may be perceived as excessive as it does not take into consideration the 
jurisdictional competence of the flag state, but also as being arrogant as it is based on the precept 
‘you can come in my ports but only under my rules’. It denies, therefore, an important element of 
exercise of jurisdiction, namely the balancing of interests.  
                                                          
198 Cottier, et al., supra note 9, p. 319, state: “Territoriality often will be a matter of practical expediency as states are 
largely dependent upon attachment to their territory one way or another in implementing laws and measures.”  
199 Parrish, supra note 31, p. 1674, points out, and criticizes, a trend of decisions in the United States which have 
held that the regulation of foreign activities abroad is not necessarily extraterritorial “by redefining extraterritoriality 
itself”. 
200 Ryngaert, supra note 10, p. 99, points out that the United States “has construed the territorial principle rather 
broadly in order to get to grips with the challenges posed by transnational crime and economic globalization.”  
201 Parrish, supra note 31, p. 1675, criticises this “redefinition of extraterritoriality” and “explains why redefining 
extraterritoriality obscures an already difficult analysis” and then “suggests that a return to well-established law 
would correct some of the excesses of transnational litigation.”  
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Furthermore, unclear and extended uses of the territorial principle in cases of regulation of 
extraterritorial activities deprives international law from a clear elaboration and development of 
jurisdictional principles. A similar point was made by Ellis referring to a case concerning the 
(extraterritorial) application of U.S. laws over a Canadian company located in Canada.202 She did 
not find fault with the outcome, which she argued was in line with justice (otherwise there would 
have been no compensation or reparation of the environmental damage), but questioned the 
reasoning and the legal basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. She argued that “what is required in 
particular is an acknowledgment of the relevance of concerns of foreign parties and governments 
in extraterritorial cases”.203 Clear representation of jurisdictional competence will, as Buxbaum 
argues, “generate a conversation about what lies behind claims of territoriality and 
extraterritoriality thereby creating more specific awareness of what is being contested – not only 
the power of particular actors to regulate certain conduct, but the shape of the global regulatory 
community”.204 As noted by Scott, “notions of territoriality and extraterritoriality are legal 
constructs” and “while labels and categories can help to map the legal landscape, it is crucial to 
look beneath the surface of labels and categories”.205 It might well be that the limits between 
territoriality and extraterritoriality cannot be established with certainty, but it is submitted that 
what matters is the justification of the scope of the measures beyond and despite the location of 
the activities and the existence of a jurisdictional link. Justification of extraterritoriality including 
                                                          
202 Pakootas v Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir.2006). 
203 J. Ellis, “Extraterritorial Exercise of Jurisdiction for Environmental Protection: Addressing Fairness Concerns” 
25 Leiden Journal of International Law (2012), p. 411.  Similar concerns regarding the reasoning of the court were 
expressed by Parrish, supra note 31, p.1694-1695.  
204 Buxbaum, supra note 7, p. 675.  
Gattini, supra note 175, p. 984, makes some interesting comments regarding the ATA Case, arguing that the 
CJEU could have justified jurisdiction on a different jurisdictional basis instead of “hopelessly clinging to traditional 
but misplaced legal concepts” and that this “would have rendered the EU and its environmental policy a better 
service.” He adds “if it is only understandable that the Court shies away from such a radical statement, it is true that 
the time should by now be ripe for the Court to embrace more openly the extraterritorial ambition of EU law.”  
205 Scott, supra note 11, p. 89. 
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consideration of the impact of such exercise upon the interests of other states could provide 
legitimacy and circumvent problems related to the limits of territoriality.  
Existing extraterritorial jurisdictional principles have been suggested as providing a 
framework for the exercise of jurisdiction for the protection of global commons and the 
environment by the port state.  
The protective principle has been suggested as offering such a potential jurisdictional basis 
for the port state with respect to the protection of its national interests.206 The protective principle 
has mainly been developed to reflect vital interests of the state such as its sovereignty and 
political independence.207 While further interests of the state could be protected and invoked, this 
principle does not reflect the main rationale of the practice examined above which is the 
protection of the global commons and the common interests of the international community.  
The notion of exercise of jurisdiction for the protection of interests of the international 
community and on its behalf may be more appropriately reflected by the principle of universal 
jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction allows states to exercise jurisdiction over certain offences 
regardless of the location of their commission (or the existence of any other jurisdictional link) 
due to the nature of the crimes.208 Disagreements over the crimes and discrepancy in the 
approaches in national legislation, but also disagreement over the conditions and requirements 
for the exercise of universal jurisdiction, have hindered its application,209 though its acceptance 
                                                          
206 Rose and Tsamenyi, supra note 51, p. 68, 77. 
207 U.S. Third Restatement, supra note 14, para. 402, “a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to ... 3. 
Certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the security of the state or 
against a limited class of other state interests.” Ryngaert, supra note 10, p. 114, comments “some states may 
construe sovereignty and political independence rather broadly: they may not only include in the protective principle 
espionage, terrorism, or counterfeiting, but also drug-trafficking, the latter at first sight being difficult to square with 
the protection of state interests.”  
208 Ibid., Section 404: “offences recognised by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, 
slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes and perhaps certain acts of terrorism.”  
209 See, for example, the discussions at the Sixth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on the scope and 
application of the principle of universal jurisdiction, 65th - 69th session, at 
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in international law is not disputed.210 Damage to the global commons would need to be 
recognised by the international community as a crime similar to piracy or as an international 
crime in order to give rise to the exercise of universal jurisdiction.211 There is, however, a 
practical and conceptual difference – in the case of universal jurisdiction (at least in its pure 
form) there is no necessary nexus between the state exercising jurisdiction and the activity; 
whereas in the case of possible extraterritorial jurisdiction for the protection of global commons, 
the state exercising jurisdiction has an interest and a link with the regulated activities as any 
damage to the global commons has direct impacts not only upon the interests of the international 
community, but also upon the state itself. In this sense, the jurisdictional link may relate to the 
effect of the regulated activities upon the global commons whose stakeholders are all 
states/nations.   
The effects doctrine may form the basis for the extraterritorial jurisdiction by a (port) state 
in cases of protection of global commons.212 The effects doctrine, however, is controversial with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
<www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/69/universal_jurisdiction.shtml> and the relevant reports of the U.N. Secretary General 
presented in these sessions. See also M. Langer, “The diplomacy of universal jurisdiction: the political branches and 
the transnational prosecution of international crimes,” 105 American Journal of International Law (2011), p. 1.  
210 The U.N. General Assembly Sixth Committee discussion above, supra note 209, clearly acknowledged that 
“universal jurisdiction was an important principle in the fight against impunity and that its validity was beyond 
doubt”, at <www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/113> (GA). See also A. Zimmermann, “Violations 
of fundamental norms of international law and the exercise of universal jurisdiction in criminal matters” in C. 
Tomushat and J-M. Thouvenin (eds.) The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens and 
Obligations Erga Omnes (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), p. 351. On the controversial nature and application of universal 
jurisdiction, see C. Ryngaert, supra note 10, p. 126-135. 
211 Ozcayir, supra note 75, p. 82, argues that the issue of the application of the universality principle to justify port 
state enforcement jurisdiction on the high seas remains controversial. Tsamenyi and Rose, supra note 51, p. 4, advise 
against the use of universal jurisdiction, commenting that:  
Promoting a new form of universal crime in the form of a defined series of acts that harm Marine Living 
Resources (MLR) and are criminalised directly under international law would be a most difficult 
challenge. The four universal crimes established by the mid-twentieth century (genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and torture) are even still, in the twenty-first century, subject to major and bitter 
controversies as to their legal definitions and proper enforcement. Elevating or recasting illegal harms to 
MLR as universal crimes would be a quite long term and probably quixotic undertaking. 
212 McDorman, supra note 1, p. 321, argues that “under existing law, where the discharge violation affects the port 
state, enforcement action arguably could be taken”. Sands and Peel, supra note 4, p. 195 comment: “where activities 
carried out in one state have, or are likely to have, effects in another state, recourse might be had to the objective 
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some states accepting it – though on the basis of diverse requirements. The doctrine has been 
mainly invoked in cases of competition and antitrust law, but there is some support with respect 
to environmental protection and maritime affairs.213 The Permanent Court in the Lotus Case 
appears to have accepted the effects doctrine with respect to activities on the high seas which 
have an impact on the territory on a state – though in that Case, the territory was perceived to be 
the Turkish vessel.214 In the Pacific Merchant Shipping Association v Goldstene case, the U.S. 
District and Ninth Circuit Courts also applied the effects doctrine with respect to specific 
environmental impacts and substantial effects within California caused by the regulated 
activities.215 The relevance of the effects doctrine was implicitly referred to by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in the ATA Case and more explicitly by the Advocate General.216 
A.G. Kokott seemed to accept the relevance of the effects doctrine for environmental problems 
especially based on their transboundary and global nature, and the need for states to protect an 
interest of the international community.217  
Interestingly, it has been suggested that the effects doctrine relies on international 
solidarity. Higgins argues:  
applying a more flexible approach to decision-making, […] the key to the issue lies 
in the protection of common values rather than the invocation of state sovereignty for 
its own sake. […] The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction to that end 
[international solidarity] seems to me as acceptable as its exercise in the other non-
territorial bases of jurisdiction.218   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
application of the territorial principle otherwise known as the ‘effects’ doctrine’,” however they point out that the 
doctrine is of doubtful consistency and there is controversy regarding its application.  
213 See Ringbom (2011), supra note 49, p. 630 and McDorman, supra note 1, p. 321.  
214 Lotus Case, supra note 16, p. 23. The Court regarded the “effects doctrine” as part of the territorial principle.  
215 PMSA v Goldstene, supra note 127, p. 1170-1, 1175. 
216 ATA Case, supra note 168 and “Opinion of AG Kokott,” supra note 176 and above notes 181-183. 
217 “Opinion of AG Kokott”, supra note 176. 
218 Higgins, supra note 25, p. 77. Similarly, see Council of Europe: European Committee on Crime Problems, 
“Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction”, 3 Criminal Law Forum (1992), p. 465, which commented that: “Public 
international law does not impose any limitations on the freedom of states to establish forms of extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction where they are based on international solidarity between states in the fight against crime.”  
48 
 
The potential relevance of a broader effects doctrine will be discussed below, but it should be 
stressed here that the effects doctrine has been applied mainly in anti-trust activities on the basis 
of specific (and rather restrictive) criteria placing an emphasis on the ascertainment of intended 
or established substantial effects felt in the territory of the state exercising jurisdiction.219 In 
environmental cases in the United States, courts referred to the substantial impact of the 
activities on the territory of the regulating state as a requirement for the application of the effects 
test.220 In the case of global commons, the effect on the territory of a state may not be able to be 
quantified or ascertained with certainty.221 It is the effect upon the global commons in whose 
protection all states are stakeholders which is relevant.  
The current framework of jurisdictional principles appears to be inadequate to 
accommodate the exercise of (extraterritorial) jurisdiction in cases of negative effects of 
activities to the global commons. What is most often identified as the global commons (and 
public goods) due to their omnipresence (i.e., climate) and transboundary and shared nature (i.e., 
fisheries and marine environment/ecosystems) do not easily fit traditional jurisdictional 
principles.  
Jurisdictional principles are developed on the basis of the ascertainment of jurisdictional 
links and conflicting interests. In this sense, balancing of rights, reasonableness and legitimacy 
determine the scope of jurisdiction and ensure that safeguards exist and are taken into account to 
prevent undue encroachments upon states’ sovereignty. Ryngaert has suggested a new theory of 
                                                          
219 See United States v Aluminium Co. of America 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) at 443 and U.S. Third Restatement, 
supra note 4, para. 403(1)(c) referring to jurisdiction over “conduct outside its territory that has or it intended to have 
substantial effect within its territory”.  
220 See the comment by the U.S. Ninth Circuit, in Pacific Merchant Shipping, supra note 127, p. 1175, responding to 
an argument by the applicants, related to the very specific impact due to the location of regulated activities in a 
maritime area directly adjacent to the territorial waters of the state.  
221 Ringbom (2011), supra note 49, p. 632, does not preclude that the effects doctrine might be relevant but stresses 
the difficulties in assessing the impact with respect to scientific evidence. Similarly Mayer, supra note 174, p. 1130-
1 stresses that “using effects to justify jurisdiction for climate change will be problematic due to lack of direct 
(palpable, evident) impacts.”  
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jurisdiction based on international interests with the main objective being the “increase [of] 
global welfare and justice”.222 Port state jurisdiction as exercised by some states and, as explored 
above, demonstrates such elements. It is the argument here that port state jurisdiction can be 
taken further to support regulating activities taking place extraterritorially which harm the global 
commons. The jurisdictional link in this context is explored in the following section.  
B. Jurisdiction for the Protection of Global Commons  
 
Reasonableness and the balancing of rights are important elements of jurisdictional competence. 
These concepts play a role in ascertaining the limits and scope of jurisdictional principles and the 
determining of the existence of a jurisdictional link.223 The U.S. Third Restatement of Foreign 
Relations provides a number of factors related to the reasonableness of the exercise by a state of 
jurisdiction over activities beyond its territory including the “importance of regulation to the 
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities and the degree to which 
the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted”.224 Reasonableness may justify and 
provide legitimacy to the establishment and ascertainment of extraterritorial jurisdictional and 
contribute to its acceptance by other states.225 The reasonableness of a jurisdictional link needs to 
be assessed on the basis of the importance of the regulatory and substantive interests involved 
and the potential infringement of the interests and sovereignty of other states.  
                                                          
222 Ryngaert, supra note 10, p. 186-7. 
223 U.S. Third Restatement, supra note 14, provides “(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under para. 302 
is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having 
connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable”. Ryngaert, supra note 10, p. 
146, argues that “assertions of jurisdiction ... based on the classical grounds of jurisdiction ... are merely prima facie 
valid. Only to the extent that they survive a subsequent reasonableness analysis, could they be considered as 
appropriate, and even lawful, under international law.”  
224 Ibid., para. 403(2). 
225 R.Y. Jennings, “Extraterritorial jurisdiction and the US Antitrust laws,” 33 British Yearbook of International Law 
(1957), p. 152, argues that “it is reasonable to say that international law will permit a state to exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction provided that state’s legitimate interests (legitimate that is to say the interests accepted in the common 
practice of states) are involved.” Oliver, supra note 147, p. 244-245, comments: “the more vital the interest and the 
more the exercise of jurisdiction is directly related to protecting or promoting it, the more likely the international 
community will respect it as appropriate”.  
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The balance is between the sovereignty of the state exercising jurisdiction and the 
sovereignty of third states whose sovereign rights and interests may be encroached upon by this 
exercise.226 The main aim of jurisdictional rules is to ensure that a situation is regulated by a 
state with a close jurisdictional link. It can be argued that reasonableness and balancing of 
interests is related to effectiveness since the state with the closest link will be in a better position 
to effectively regulate a situation. It is the argument here that common interests of the 
international community in the protection of the global environment are also an important factor 
in jurisdictional balancing.  
The global commons and the global environment have been recognised as a “common 
concern” of humankind necessitating international cooperation for their protection but also 
reflecting an interest of the international community in their regulation.227 A number of key 
international environmental agreements and instruments recognise environmental problems 
related to the global commons as being of common concern and incorporate obligations on all 
states to protect aspects of global commons.228  
The consideration of global commons as an issue of common concern relates to their 
exploitation being linked to “the tragedy of the commons”229 and the creation of externalities for 
all states by their use. All states, it is argued, benefit from measures for their protection and all 
                                                          
226 Mann, supra note 17, p. 30, points out that “jurisdiction is an aspect of sovereignty, it is coextensive with and, 
indeed, incidental to, but also limited by, the state’s sovereignty.” See also Ryngaert, supra note 10, p. 39-41 and 
U.S. Third Restatement, supra note 14, para. 403 (2).  
227 Shelton, supra note 9, p. 34-5, argues that: “the climate, the stratospheric ozone layer, the oceans, and indeed the 
entire physical world form an interdependent ecological system, much of which can only be protected at the global 
level, making it a common concern for all humanity”. See also J. Brunee, “Common areas, common heritage, and 
common concern” in D. Bodansky, et al., (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), p. 553-4 and Cottier, et al., supra note 9, p. 298-299. 
228 See, for example, LOSC, supra note 27, articles 192, 194 and 117-8. See also: U.N. Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, preamble, “Acknowledging that change in the Earth's climate and its adverse 
effects are a common concern of humankind” and “Acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for 
the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international 
response, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their 
social and economic conditions.”  
229 F. Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons”, 162 Science (1968), p. 1243. 
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states – due to the community of interests – are affected by activities impacting them. Due to 
their physical and legal attributes, global commons are “beyond the reach of individual 
states”.230 They transcend states, and belong and relate to humankind including present and 
future generations. Their open access to all, non-exclusivity, non-appropriation or no sovereignty 
over them, and the need for collective action underpin their consideration as a common concern 
of humankind.  
The concept of global public goods, a term from economics, has been invoked in the legal 
literature as relevant – to an extent – to issues related to environmental governance. The global 
commons can be regarded as global public goods especially considering that “states cannot be 
excluded from receiving the benefits of a global public good, whether they contributed to its 
creation or not, they are able to free ride on the efforts of others”.231 Both the global commons 
and their protection can be perceived as global public goods. States, therefore, contribute to the 
provision of a global public good which is protection of global commons, but also benefit from 
the provision of public goods as free riders. In the latter case and due to the production of 
negative externalities for free riders, (over)exploitation of global commons can be perceived as a 
global public bad.232  
The concept of common concern and the collective nature and objective of the protection 
of global commons may legitimise the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Lowe argues that 
“extraterritorial claims are more likely to be acceptable when used in service of legislation 
upholding generally-held values”.233 This reflects what has been suggested in the literature as the 
                                                          
230 Brunee, supra note 227, p. 554. 
231 D. Bodansky, “What’s in a Concept? Global Public Goods, International Law, and Legitimacy,” 23 European 
Journal of International Law (2012), p. 658. See also N. Krisch, “The decay of consent: international law in an age 
of global public goods,” 108 American Journal of International Law (2014), p. 15: “Environmental protection is the 
quintessential public good in that it is non-exclusive and non-rivalrous in consumption”.  
232 Bodansky, supra note 231, p. 658, 664-5, 653-5.  
233 Lowe, supra note 195, p. 734. 
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normative content of the principle of common concern.234 Apart from the obligation to cooperate 
in order to collectively address the concern, and invoking responsibility for harm to global 
commons, Cottier argues that “a principle of common concern forms the normative foundation 
and the limits for states to take lawful unilateral action with extraterritorial effects within the 
bounds of international law where international cooperation and joint action remains absent”.235 
Similarly, Shaffer argues that despite the problems related to unilateral action, it “may also be an 
important part of a broader transnational process leading to the production of a global public 
good over time” stressing the interaction of legal orders and lack of centralisation and 
hierarchy.236 The nature of global commons as public goods also legitimises the exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Krisch argues that driven by the provision of global public goods 
“this effects-based rationale for jurisdiction .... enables each state affected by an issue – that is, 
for matters of global public goods, all states – to exercise regulatory powers”.237 
In this respect, the jurisdictional link relates to whether activities over which jurisdiction is 
exercised have a measurable impact/effect upon the global commons and the “attainment of the 
common concern”.238 The jurisdictional balancing of interests does not relate only to interests of 
                                                          
234 Cottier, et al., supra note 9, p. 314 et seq. Brunée argues, supra note 227, p. 566 that  
the concept of common concern does not imply a specific rule for the conduct of states. Nonetheless, it 
signals that states’ freedom of action may be subject to limits even where other states’ sovereign rights 
are not affected in the direct transboundary sense envisaged by the no harm principle. ... all states would 
have concomitant legal interests and could demand others to adjust their conduct accordingly.  
N. Matz, “Comment: the common interest in international law: some reflections on its normative content,” 62 
Heidelberg Journal of International Law (2002), p. 19, takes a middle-ground view on the normativity of the 
concept: “while still lacking legal content itself, the concept already has legal implications concerning the 
enforcement of law. As such it is also one of the most important aspects of the progressive development of 
international environmental law and the restriction of national sovereignty for the benefit of the community of 
states.”  
235 Cottier, et al., supra note 9, p. 296.   
236 Shaffer, supra note 8, p. 691 stresses that: “In practice, unilateralism may help to produce a global public good 
where common action fails, especially in light of opt-in rules under international treaties.” 
237 Krisch, supra note 231, p. 20. Further, at p. 13, he stresses that this approach could circumvent key problems such 
as “substantive disagreement, free riding and distribution of costs, which are typically seen as key obstacles to 
reaching cooperative schemes,” but he also acknowledges its weaknesses.  
238 T. Cottier, “The emerging principle of common concern: a brief outline,” Working paper No 2012/20 (May 
2012), p. 8, at <www.nccr-trade.org/publication/the-emerging-principle-of-common-concern/>.  
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individual states but also to “the greater interests of humanity and planetary welfare,” to use the 
wording of Judge Weeramantry in his separate opinion in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case.239 
This legitimises the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction since it can be argued that the 
encroachment upon the interests of the flag state are outweighed by the protection and regulation 
of common interests which includes the interests of the flag state itself. Sovereignty in this sense 
is not side-lined but exercised for the protection of global interests.240 This is in line with 
academic views of modern concepts of jurisdiction which perceive states as “de facto ... global 
regulators of internationally relevant situations” and sovereignty as responsibility for regulation 
with the common interest in mind,241 and which endorse jurisdiction by states in cases of “global 
governance gaps” beyond solely the protection of national interests.242 
Legitimacy and reasonableness are also interlinked with effectiveness and necessity.243 The 
role of the port state in environmental regulation has been justified on the basis of practicality 
and effectiveness since it is easy for port states to inspect and take enforcement measures against 
                                                          
239 Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), [1997] I.C.J. Reports 7, separate 
opinion of Vice-president Weeramantry, p. 118.  
240 See Matz, supra note 234, p. 19. Sands and Peel, supra note 4, p. 193, refer to “a more modern conception of an 
ecologically interdependent world in which limits are placed in the exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights.” It is 
noted that  
for ‘shared natural resources’ such as the high seas and atmosphere, it will often be difficult, if not 
impossible, to draw a clear link between natural resources over which a state does and does not have 
sovereignty or exercise sovereign rights. In such circumstances, it is unlikely that the principle of 
territorial sovereignty, or permanent sovereignty over natural resources, can provide much assistance in 
allocating rights and responsibilities of states over environmental policy. 
241 Ryngaert, supra note 10, p. 190.  
242 See Berman, supra note 7, p. 491 who advances a “cosmopolitan conception of jurisdiction aim[ing] to capture a 
jurisdictional middle ground between strict territorialism on the one hand and expansive universalism on the other.”  
243 D. Bodansky, “What’s so bad about unilateral action to protect the environment?” 11 European Journal of 
International Law (2000), 346, discusses necessity as one of the factors to be taken into account in weighing “the 
benefits to the environment of a unilateral action against the costs of that action to the stability of the international 
system.” The same author at p. 667, argues that when an international agreement or multilateral response is not 
possible, the legitimacy of the unilateral effort “will tend to be evaluated after the fact, in terms of whether it was 
successful in providing the public good.”  
Matz, supra note 234, p. 18, argues that “the recognition of the necessity to generally restrict national 
sovereignty as far as common interests are concerned is an important aspect of the development of international 
environmental law.”  
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vessels in ports, and due to the failure of flag states to enforce such measures on the high seas.244 
Contemporary approaches in the conflict of laws discipline and practice also demonstrate the 
importance of effectiveness with respect to jurisdictional conflicts. Specifically, the 
“substantivist approach” calls for the selection of the law in certain cases to be made on the basis 
of the substantive content of the law (choice of law theory) without regard to territorial 
linkages.245 Due to the interconnectedness of the global environment, denying states the right to 
regulate (even indirectly) behaviour outside their territory can be seen as depriving them of the 
right to protect their environmental interests.246  
The existence of legitimate interests and the protection of global commons with respect to 
measures with extraterritorial effect were addressed by the WTO Appellate Body in the 
Shrimp/Turtle Case. The Appellate Body gave some, admittedly cautious, approval of the 
possibility of adoption of measures related to protection of species located outside a state’s 
jurisdiction.247 It was careful to note that it did not “pass upon the question of whether there is an 
implied jurisdiction limitation in article XX(g)” and referred to the fact that in the specific case 
“the sea turtle species here at stake [...] are all known to occur in waters over which the United 
                                                          
244 See S.A. Hagan, “Too big to tackle? The persistent problem of pirate fishing and the new focus on port state 
measures,” 37 Suffolk Transnational Law Review (2014), p. 129, who argues: “Concentrating regulatory efforts at 
ports is cost-effective, safer, and more logistically efficient, as entry through the port is a necessary step in the 
supply chain from ocean to table.”   
245 H.L. Buxbaum, “Conflict of economic laws: from sovereignty to substance,” 42 Virginia Journal of International 
Law (2002), p. 956 notes that:  
The term substantivism ... is used to describe a choice-of-law methodology whose goal is to select the 
better law in any given case. Under this approach, the analysis of substantive content is central and not 
merely an aspect of an otherwise territory- or sovereignty-based approach. Under this approach, in other 
words, a court faced with a choice-of-law problem will resolve it by choosing a law rather than a 
jurisdiction. 
See also R.A. Leflar, “Choice-Influencing considerations in conflicts law,” 41 NYU Law Review (1966), p. 295-304 
and Ryngaert, supra note 10, p. 199 et seq. 
246 See comments by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Mirkovich v Milnor, supra note 126, p. 412. 
247 United States – Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products, DS58/AB/R, Report of Appellate 
Body, available on the WTO website, at <www.wto.org>. 
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States exercises jurisdiction”.248 Despite this territorial link, which was stressed for purposes of 
factual evidence without however apparent normative or interpretative intention, the Appellate 
Body stressed the existence of a “sufficient nexus between the migratory and endangered marine 
populations involved and the US”.249 Importance was also placed upon the fact that neither 
litigant claimed “exclusive ownership over the sea turtles”.250 It was thus implied that the United 
States had a legitimate interest in the conservation of turtles outside its national jurisdiction,251 
which may be dependent on the effects caused by the relevant activities upon these interests and 
the specific global common.  
C. Protection of Global Commons and Jurisdictional Safeguards 
Jurisdiction grounded on the harmful effects of activities upon the global commons raise a 
number of concerns which need to be considered carefully. The exercise of legislative and 
enforcement jurisdiction in the case of protection of global commons can be criticised as a form 
of unilateralism ignoring the principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, and therefore the 
consensual nature of international law, or the absence of international consensus with respect to 
the regulation of a specific problem.252  The imposition of unilaterally-prescribed measures upon 
                                                          
248 Ibid., para. 133. 
249 Ibid. See Ryngaert, supra note 10, p. 98 and Bartels, supra note 191, p. 388-9. 
250 Ibid., para. 133.  Would the contrary, namely, that the species cannot be found within the jurisdiction of a state, 
deprive the state of their right to legislate or diminish its legitimate interest? The Appellate Body did not seem to 
imply this, rather it focused on the facts of the specific situation and stressed that it was not making general 
comments regarding jurisdictional issues. 
251 Sands and Peel, supra note 4, p. 193. See also P. Sands, “‘Unilateralism,’ values and international law,” 11 
European Journal of International Law (2000), p. 299, who argues that “the decision may be seen as a radical 
expression by a leading international judicial authority of the potential capacity of state to act unilaterally in seeking 
to apply their environmental standards to activities taking place outside their jurisdiction.”  
252 Generally on unilateralism, see Bodansky, supra  note 243, p. 341. Sands, supra note 251, p. 293, comments: 
“Unilateral acts become especially contentious where they are associated with the imposition by one community of 
its values on another community, and where that other community has not consented to or acquiesced in the 
imposition of such values.” See also L. Boisson de Chazournes, “Unilateralism and environmental protection: issues 
of perception and reality of issues,” 11 European Journal of International Law (2000), p. 315-338 and Ryngaert, 
supra note 10, p. 185, 188. 
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states which have not accepted them may also be considered as green imperialism and as an 
infringement upon sovereignty and state equality. 
However, international standards enforced vis-à-vis third states may not truly be unilateral where 
they are in line with objectives and obligations derived from international instruments.253 The 
jurisdiction assumed by a state can be said to reflect (general though not unanimous) 
international consensus and is undertaken to facilitate the effectiveness of international rules254 
with respect to the non-compliance of free-riders. The lack of international consensus regarding 
specific measures enforced upon vessels by a port state can be controversial due to the 
imposition of nationally-prescribed rules upon other members of the international community 
and the impact the enforcement may have upon the shipping industry which relies on uniformity 
and the universality of standards. The principle of common concern mitigates the unilateral 
aspect of such measures by focusing on their objective and benefits. This can legitimise 
jurisdictional competence, but also restrict it. Port states need to ensure that any such “unilateral” 
measures reflect an international consensus with respect to the protection of specific aspects of 
the global commons in line with multilateral instruments and cooperative processes. Cottier 
refers to “common concern as a principle instigating both cooperation and unilateral action in a 
dialectical process”.255 The aim of such measures should be to enhance the efficiency of 
                                                          
253 The obligations can be specific, i.e., rules related to conservation of fishing resources enshrined in RFMOs or 
more general related to the protection of the marine environment, LOSC provisions or commitments to tackle 
climate change.  
Molenaar, supra note 45, p. 243, notes that such measures are not unilateral “because [they] support the 
interests of specific other states or the international community in general”. Bodansky, supra note 243, p. 345 
comments:  
... unilateral action, although questionable from a process standpoint, may nevertheless be justified by its 
substantive objectives and results. When unilateral action is aimed at developing multilateral standards 
that are impartial and advances shared objectives, rather than parochial national interests, then it can play 
a beneficial role in the international standard-setting process. 
254 The EU in its submission as a third party to the Shrimp/Turtle Case stated that: “In this field [international 
environmental law], the application of agreed rules beyond the normal jurisdictional limits of Members might 
indeed be necessary to ensure effective application of such rules.” Shrimp/Turtle Case, supra note 247, para. 356. 
255 Cottier, et al., supra note 9, p. 296. 
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multilateral/collective measures vis-à-vis free riders or to create “incentives to international 
cooperation under the same principle of common concern”.256 In this respect, jurisdictional 
safeguards such as necessity257 and proportionality of the legislation vis-à-vis the specific 
objective, including the consideration of alternatives related to less intrusive means without the 
extraterritorial scope,258 would need to be taken into account. Multilateral efforts should be 
attempted before there is an exercise of jurisdiction,259 and in cases of inconclusive discussions 
at the international level, the adopted national measures should not preclude but should 
strengthen the possibility of adopting multilateral measures by streamlining its content with 
relevant suggestions and options for future international standards.260  
A further jurisdictional safeguard concerns the interests of the flag state, as the state having 
concurrent jurisdiction. The concept of subsidiarity suggested by Ryngaert is interesting and 
relevant in this respect. He argues that if the state with the strongest link to a situation does not 
assume its jurisdictional responsibility, it may forfeit its right to protest against other states’ 
jurisdictional assertions over that situation.261 He links this failure to assume jurisdiction with its 
consequences being “on aggregate, harmful to, the regulatory interests of the international 
community”.262 This subsidiarity has already been observed in port measures in international 
instruments and state practice and legislation discussed above since the enforcement of port 
measures requires the flag state to be notified so as to enhance cooperation and implementation 
                                                          
256 Ibid., p. 302.  
257 Bodansky, supra note 243, p. 346, discusses the following criteria with respect to necessity: “is unilateral action 
truly necessary to promote an international standard, or is there a prospect of developing an effective multilateral 
regime? And if the latter, is there sufficient time to pursue the international option, given the nature of the 
environmental threat?”  
258 Ringbom (2008), supra note 49, p. 375, refers to achieving the objective of the legislation only by extending the 
rule to the high seas.  
259 WTO Shrimp/Turtle Case, supra note 247.  
260 See for example Regulation (EU) 2015/757, supra note 94, article 22, para. 3, where the EU noted that the 
legislative initiative was due to the lack of a relevant agreement in the IMO, but also clearly expressed its preference 
for an international agreement and cooperation.  




of the relevant measures.263 But at the same time the failure of flag states (especially continuous 
failure as has been manifest in fisheries regulation) to exercise regulatory jurisdiction over its 
vessels or their reluctance to subscribe to international rules or act for the protection of global 
interests justifies their circumvention in favour of a state willing and capable of asserting this 
jurisdiction.  
Further cooperation and collaboration may be attempted with various stakeholders in order 
to enhance the understanding of the need and scope of the substantive aspect of jurisdictional 
protection referring to common interests. Better understanding of the regulatory intention and 
implications, especially in cases of exercise of jurisdiction related to unilaterally-prescribed 
measures, could legitimise the process and facilitate and strengthen acceptance by other states 
and stakeholders. Considerations related to the measures themselves can also function as 
safeguards of reasonableness, such as costs implications, flexibility and potential inclusion of 
alternative means to minimise costs and enhance compliance by vessels, and interference with 
navigation and trade.  
V. Concluding Remarks 
This article has examined the practice of port states exercising authority over vessels in port 
where the actions of the vessels raised questions or concerns about the global commons with the 
view to ascertaining the scope and limits of the exercise of such jurisdiction. An expansion of 
port state jurisdiction in instances of measures with extraterritorial application and effects in 
cases of protection of global commons was observed. There was also a reticence to endorse 
extraterritoriality explicitly and directly. Reliance on entry requirements was important in cases 
                                                          
263 Subsidiarity is also implied LOSC, supra note 27, in articles 218(4) (regarding notification of the flag state) and 
228(1) (suspension of proceedings by the port state if the flag state initiates proceedings unless the flag state has 
“repeatedly disregarded its obligation”. In a similar way Directive 2008/101 (supra note 169) requires that the EU 
take into account the measures that other states had taken to tackle climate change from aviation (see article 25a). 
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with a more direct regulation of extraterritorial activities such in the cases of fisheries and traffic 
schemes. It was argued that entry requirements cannot be disassociated from the exercise of 
jurisdiction, while the imposition of such requirements needs to be in line with concepts such as 
good faith and non-abuse of right which are also relevant for the exercise of jurisdiction.  
It was further suggested that an expanded territorial principle may not clearly and 
sufficiently justify the extraterritorial elements which need to be validated by the existence of a 
reasonable jurisdictional link. Territoriality can provide only a limited solution to the protection 
of global commons, and, as indicated by state practice and the attempts of states to territorialise 
the offences (especially related to fisheries), it may be restrictive with respect to the measures 
and their enforcement. This may mean that the port state can not take advantage of all the 
possible jurisdictional options in international law, since extraterritorial jurisdiction has been 
successfully used by states for various reasons. It will be a missed opportunity if port states do 
not develop or utilize such potential. 
A number of generally-accepted jurisdictional principles and their relevance as 
jurisdictional bases for the exercise of extraterritorial port state jurisdiction for the protection of 
global commons were explored. Despite the fact that aspects of these jurisdictional principles 
were found to be relevant, a jurisdictional framework – based on elements of state practice as 
analysed in the article - was developed with respect to the existence of a legitimate and 
reasonable jurisdictional link based on the concept of global commons as an issue of common 
concern and the effect the regulated activities have upon them. It was argued that these concepts 
legitimise the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the port state and provide a legitimate 
jurisdictional link. This is seen as being in line with contemporary aspects of jurisdiction based 
on legitimacy, reasonableness, effectiveness and necessity.  
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Engagement with extraterritorial elements can strengthen the jurisdictional assertions via a 
process of legitimisation where the interests of other states and the international community are 
taken into account and potential encroachments upon sovereign rights and interests can be 
averted. The cooperative and multilateral aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to the 
protection of the global commons by virtue of international instruments and the resultant 
obligations of states to protect them can provide a reasonable and legitimate basis for the 
exercise of jurisdiction. Further safeguards have been suggested to ensure that the exercise of 
jurisdiction is reasonable and clearly reflects a legitimate balancing of state interests, which is an 
integral part of jurisdictional assertions.  
 
